Notre Dame Law Reporter Vol. 2 Issue 4 by Notre Dame Law Reporter Association
Notre Dame Law School
NDLScholarship
Notre Dame Law Reporter Law School Publications
6-1921
Notre Dame Law Reporter Vol. 2 Issue 4
Notre Dame Law Reporter Association
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlaw_reporter
Part of the Law Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre
Dame Law Reporter by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Notre Dame Law Reporter Association, "Notre Dame Law Reporter Vol. 2 Issue 4" (1921). Notre Dame Law Reporter. Book 3.
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlaw_reporter/3






SUPREME COURT OF NOTRE DAME,
WAGNER V. PARKER, - - - -
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, - - -
1BRIEF FOR APPELLEE - -
NOTRE DAME CIRCUIT COURT, - -
CRIMINAL PRACTICE COURT - - -
ONLY OUR OWN OPINION
- - - - Opinion of the Court - 2
- - - - Chas.P.J.Mooney, Jr. 21
- - - Walter A. Rice ----- 28
- - - Record of Cases ---- 33
- - - - Proceedings ------- 36
IN CONGRATULATION -- ------ - EdwinA.Fredricson 39
ALUMNI DEPARTMENT
CONTRIBUTING SECTION
COMMON LAW ACTION IN EQUITY GARB - Vincent Gibbh, '!8 - - 41
NEWS SECTION
CLASS OF '21 AT THE BAR ------ Letters and Notes --- 43
ABOUT THE ALUMNI -- ------ - Personals -------- 44
DIRECTORY OF ALUMNI LAWYERS -. .---------------- 46
UNITED STATES O:F AMERICA)
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAMEf s
Be it remembered: That the Notre Dame Law Reporter
will be published at Notre Dame, Indiana, quarterly during
the scholastic year, for $2.00 per year or 50c per copy; that
the Reporter has been entered as second-class matter at
the Postoffice at Notre Dame, Indiana, and that copyright
has been granted.
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER ASSOCIATION
Notre Dame, Indiana.
Page
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER





Sale-Validity Between Parties-Bulk Sales
Act-Construction-Fraud on Crditors-
Actual or Constructive-Pleading as De-
fense-Ex turpie causa nulla actio oritur-
In pari delicto.
1. Where, persuant to contract, W exe-
cutes and delivers to P his promissory note
and the assignment of his land contract, in
consideration of the sale and transfer to
him by P of the latter's stock of merchan-
dise and his promise to pay the claims of
his creditors, and P,. after transfering the-
stock to W, fails and refuses to pay the
claims of his creditors, but permits such
stock to be taken under the Bulk Sales Law
to satisfy such claims, W is entitled in
equity to the cancellation of his note and
the recission of the assignment of his land
contract as against P.
2. For the failure or refusal of one of
the parties to perform an essential part of
his contract, the other party may have a re-
cission thereof.
3. The Bulk Sales Law, declaring fraud-
ulent and void as against creditors of the
seller, a sale of merchandise in bulk, merely
makes such sail voidable, and voidable only
at the instance of the creditors. Such sale
is perfectly legal and binding as between
the parties themslves as to all rights and
remedies under their contract of sale. The
Bulk Sales Law has no application whatever
to the contracting parties, if the claims of
the seller's creditors are paid or otherwise
provided for.
4. Contracts and conveyances made in
fraud of creditors, whether in constructive
fraud'as in violation of the Bulk Sales Law,
or in actual fraud in violation of the Stat-
utes 13 and 27 Elizabeth as enacted in the
States,are voidable only as to creditors. Such
contracts and conveyances, both at com-
mon law and under these statutes, are per-
fectly legal and enforcible between the par-
ties. When executed, they cannot be avoid-
ed by either party on the ground that they
-were made to defraud creditors; and when
executory, they are enforcible in all their
terms as any other contract. Neither party
will be permitted to plead his fraud upon
creditors as a defense in his own behalf in
any case where such fraud is not necessary
to sustain plaintiff's right of action.
5. The text statement of 12 Ruling Case
Law, pg. 610, par. 120, made in connection
with the subject of executed contracts, that
is, that "If a contract is made for the trans-
fer of property to defraud the creditors of
the transferor, the contract, while execu-
tory, cannot be enforced either in equity or
at law. The fraud may be set up as an ab-
solute defense," isinaccurate and mislead-
ing, and is in conflict with the true rule for
determining the enforcement of such con-
tracts, as stated in 12 R. C. L., pg. 613, par.
123, as follows: "That party must fail whose
case is incomplete without proof of the
fraud." Such "fraud not being an ingred-
ient in the plaintiff's case, and being un-
available as a defense," recovery may be
had thereon. Such executory contracts in
fraud of creditors as well as those executed.
being perfectly legal and binding as be-
tween the parties both at common law and
under the Elizabeth statutes of frauds, are
enforcible as other contracts, except where
plaintiff must plead or prove such fraud to
establish his case.
6. Whteher a plaintiff comes into court"with the metaphorical unclean hands,"
whether his action is founded on an illegal
contract or transaction, or in his own
wrong, must me determined by his pleading
and proof, and not by what the defendant
may plead or prove.
7. If the plaintiff pleads a good cause
of action on an executory contract, and the
fact of fraud upon creditors is not neces-
sary to the pleading or proof of his case,
he is entitled to recover. In such case the
doctrine in pari delicto has no application
whatever. And it is a violation of the
mixim ex turpi causa nulla acto oritur to
permit defendant to plead his own fraud
upon creditors as a defense, for neither may
plead his iniquity as a defense any more
than as a cause of action.
WAGNER VS. PARKER
No. 10
Suit by John Wagner, the appel-
lant, against Nathan Parker, the ap-
pellee, for the cancellation of a prom-
issory note and the reassignment of
a certain land contract. From a
judgment for the defendant, Parker,
the plaintiff, Wagner, appeals. Re-
versed.
Charles P. J. Mooney, Jr. and Ger-
ald J. Craugh, for appellant.
Walter A. Rice and Charles M.
Dunn, for appellee.
VURPILLAT, J. Wagner and
Parker, the parties to this suit, were,
on August 1, 1920, residents of St.
Joseph County, Indiana; and then
and there entered into a written con-
tract by which Parker agreed to sell
and deliver to Wagner his certain
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grocery store located in Niles, Mich-
igan, to guarantee the title thereto,
and to pay all claims of creditors held
against said store, which claims were
expressly estimated to be about
$1,000; in consideration of which
Wagner agreed to assign, transfer
and deliver to Parker a certain con-
tract conveying all his right and ti-
tle to a specific tract of land situate
in St. Joseph County, Indiana, and
to execute and deliver to Parker his
promissory note for $400, payable in
one year. Pursuant to the terms of
this contract, Wagner executed and'
delivered said promissory note to
Parker, and also assigned and deliv-
ered to him the land contract de-
scribed. Parker then transferred
and delivered to Wagner the grocery
store in Niles, Michigan.
Soon after Wagner took possession
of the store certain creditors of Park-
er brought action on their claims for
$1100, making both Parker and Wag-
ner defendants, and proceeding.
against said store and stock of goods
according to the Bulk Sales Law of
Michigan. Appellee, Parker, in vio-
lation of his contract, refused to pay
said claims, but defaulted in the ac-
tion and permitted the creditors to
seize the store and stock. Appellant,
Wagner, made no resistance to the
action of the appellee's creditors.
That action resulted in a judgment
for $1100 and an order for the sale of
the stock of goods in virtue of the
Bulk Sales Act, and the sale had pur-
suant thereto took the entire stock of
goods and store to satisfy the judg-
ment.
Appellant, Wagner, then instituted
this suit in the Notre Dame Circuit
Court of Indiana to cancel the $400-
note held by Parker of him, and also
to secure a reassignment to him of
the land contract now held by Park-
er. The complaint is in one para-
graph, is predicated on the foregoing
statement of facts, and asks for th
relief stated, upon the theory of a
total failure of consideration.
Defendant, Parker, answered in
general denial, and for a second par-
agraph plead the Michigan Bulk
Sales Act, and alleged that plaintiff
and defendant failed to make any
compliance whatever in the sale and
transfer of defendant's stock of
goods in the Michigan store, as re-
quired by said Bulk Sales Act for the
benefit of defendant's creditors; that
the contract between plaintiff and de-
fendant was therefore illegal and
void, and that both parties were
equally at fault therein. Plaintiff's
demurrer to this second paragraph
of answer was overruled and excep-
tion was taken to the ruling. Plain-
tiff then filed reply in two para-
graphs, the first general denial, and
the second stating facts to show that
plaintiff was not in pari delicto with
defendant in the formation of their
contract for the transfer of the Mich-
igan store. Demurrer to this second
paragraph of reply was overruled.
Trial resulted in a finding and judg-
ment for the defendant. Motions for
new trial and in arrest of judgment
were overruled, and judgment for
defendant was entered from which
the plaintiff prosecutes this appeal.
Appellant assigns as error for the
reversal of the judgment, the over-
ruling of the demurrer to the second
paragraph of answer, the overruling
of the motion for a new trial, and
that the judgment is contrary to the
evidence and to the law.
It is obvious that there is a total
failure of the consideration which ap-
pellee contracted to give to appellant
for the note and land contract in suit.
The Michigan store, transferred ta
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appellant, was 4lmost immediately
thereafter taken to satisfy the claims
of creditors of appellee, and these
claims, which appellee agreed to pay
as the other part of the considera-
tion, he has failed and refused to pay.
So that, while the appellee has re-
ceived and now holds appellant's note
for $400 and his interest in the St
Joseph County land as the entire
consideration he was to receive from
the contract, the appellant has noth.
ing whatever to show as his part of
the consideration for the contract.
It is an established principle of
equity that for the failure or refusal
of one of the parties to perform ap
essential part of his contract, the
other party may have a recission
thereof. 6 R. C. L. 925; Ft. Wayne
Electric Co. vs. Miller, 131 Ind. 499-
30 N. E. 23; Tenant Land Co. vs.
Nordeman, 148 Ky. 361-146 S. W
756; Lucy vs. Bundy, 9 N. H. 298- 32
Am. Dec. 359; McGrath vs. Gegner,
77 Md. 331-39 Am. St. Rep. 415;
Norrington vs. Wright, 115 U. S. 211:
For such failure of consideration a
party may have cancellation of a
note. Kessler vs. Parlius, 107 Minn.
224-119 N. W. 1069; and the recis-
sion of a contract of conveyance.
Parkham vs. Randolph, 4 How.
(Miss.) 435-35 Am. Dec. 403; Lide
vs. Thomas (S. C.) 4 Am. Dec. 581.
This relief, which the plaintiff is or-
dinarily entitled to, was denied him
by the trial court, presumably upon
the theory advanced by defndant's
scond paragraph of answer that the
contract of the parties which pro-
vides for the transfer of the stock of
goods is governed by the Bulk Sales
Law of Michigan, is illegal and void
for the failure of the parties to com-
ply with that law with respect to
creditors of the seller, and that the
principle of equity which denies its
aid to contracting parties who are
in pari delicto in the formation of il-
legal contracts applies in this case
and bars the granting of the relief
sought.
But does the Bulk Sales Law have
that effect? Is a contract for the sale
of a stock of merchandise in bulk il-
legal and void for mere failure to
give notice of such sale to the seller's
creditors? We think not. Such con-
tract is neither illegal nor void by
any known test for determining the
illegality of contracts. A contract is
illegal if it is opposed to the common
law, if it contravenes some establish-
ed public policy, or if it is prohibited
by statute. Anson on Contracts, 223.
This contract is not opposed to any
rule of the common -law. A sale in
bulk is as valid at common-law as
any other sale. Even creditors may
attack such sale at common-law only
upon the ground of actual fraud of
the parties, and such fraud much be
pleaded and proven in the case. Nor
is a sale in bulk void as against pub-
lic policy. No "one has ever contend-
ed that such a sale contravenes any
recognized public policy. These sales
have been conducted from time im-
memorial and have never been ques-
tioned as a matter of public policy.
And finally, the contract is neither
illegal nor void by virtue of the Bulk
Sales Law. "A Statute may render an
agreement illegal in one of two ways
-- by express prohibition, or by pen-
alty. It may say in so many words,
that contracts of certain sort are il-
legal, or void, or both; and where it
expressly avoids a contract, or makes
it illegal, no doubt can arise as to the
intentions of the Legislature." An-
son on Contracts, 225. The Bulk
Sales Law neither prohibits nor pen-
alizes sales of merchandise in bulk
as such, nor does the Act declare
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such sale in itself illegal, or void, or
both. It merely provides, in general,
that a sale of a stock of merchan-
dise in bulk shall be void as against
creditors of the vendor, unless they
have a certain number' of days notice
thereof. 12 R. C. L. 525; Black's
Constitutional Law, 476, note 178. In
Riding Case Law, supra, it is said "In
general these statutes provide that
the sale of all or any portion of a
stock of merchandise otherwise than
in the ordinary course of trade shall
be fraudulent and void against cred-
itors of the seller, unless the seller
delivers to the purchaser a list of his
creditors, and the purchaser in turn
notifies such creditors of the propos-
ed sale at a stipulated time, usually
five days, in advance."
The term void is frequently used in
the statutes in the sense of voidable.
Allis vs. Billings, 6 Met. (Mass.) 415
-39 Am. Dec. 744; Crouse vs. Hol-
man, 19 Ind. 35; VanSchaak vs. Rob-
bins, 36 Iowa 201; Terrill vs. An-
chauer, 14 Ohio St. 80; Fuller vs.
Hasbrouch, 46 Mich. 82; Kearney
vs. Vaughn, 50 Mo., 284; Bromley vs.
Goodrich, 40 Wis. 131; Inskeep vs.
Lecony, I. N. J. L. III. It is said in
Beecher vs. Marquette & Pac. Ry.
Co., 45 Mich. 108, Cooley, J., "If it is
apparent that an act is prohibited
and declared void on grounds of gen-
eral policy, we must suppose the leg-
islative intent to be that it shall be
void to all intents; while if the man-
ifest intent is to give protection to
determinate individuals who are sui
priis, the purpose is sufficiently ac-
complished if they are given the lib-
erty of avoiding it." There is an en-
tire absence of any language in the
Bulk Sales Act prohibiting or de-
claring void on grounds of general
policy sales of merchandise in bulk
as such, but express provision is
made in the statute that such sale
shall, unless conditions are complied
with, be cansidered fraudulent and
void as to creditors of the vendor,
thereby clearly manifesting the in-
tent merely to give protection to de-
terminate individuals, namely: cred-
itors of the vendor. And, as in the
case of persons sui juris, for whose
protection contracts are declared
void, the purpose of the Bulk Sales
Act is sufficiently accomplished, if
these creditors are given the liberty
of avoiding the sale. As an infant's
contract is valid and enforcible un-
less the infant himself, at whose op-
tion alone it is voidable, attacks it
and asks the special protection af-
forded him by the law, so is the con-
tract of the parties to a bulk sale
valid and enforcible between them.
as to all rights and remedies, and
such contract and -sale are subject to
attack only by the vendor's credit-
ors, at whose option alone the sale
is voidable. This construction of the
Bulk Sales Act is not only supported
in principle but is uniformly sustain-
ed by the decisions of the courts of
last resort. Mac Greenery et al vs.
Murphy, 76 N. H. 338-82 Atl. 720-39
L. R. A. (NS) 374; George Kraft
Co. vs. Heller, 188 Ind. 612-125 N. E.
209; Newman vs. Garfield, (Vt.) 104
Atl. 881; Escalle vs. Mark, (Nev.)
183 Pac. 387;John P. Squire & Co..
vs. Tellier, 185 Mass. 18- 69 N. E.
312-102 Am. St. Rep. 322; Oregon
Mill Co., vs. Hyde, (Oregon) 169
Pac. 791; Benson vs. Johnson, (Ore.)
165 Pac. 1001; Spurr vs. Travis, 145
Mich, 721-108 N. W. 1090-116 Am.
St. Rep. 330; Young vs. Lemineaux,
79 Conn. 434- 65 At]. 436-129 Am. St.
Rep. 193-20 L. R. A. (NS) 160-29
Sup. Ct. 174-53 L. Ed. 295. A lead-
ing case in the construction of the
Bulk Sales Law, frequently cited
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with approval, is MacGreenery vs.
Murphy, supra. In that case the
court says: "The statute purports to
make such a sale void as against
creditors of the seller, although the
parties acted with the utmost good
faith and entertained no purpose to
defraud or to embarrass the seller's
creditors in the collection of their
claims. The sale, which was other-
wise valid as against everybody, is
made invalid as against creditors as
a matter of law. It is declared
fraudulent when no fraud was in-
tended by the parties." It is said in
12 R. C. L. 525 that "the invalidity
in any (sale) applies only to cases
where the rights of creditors are in-
volved, and sales in violation of the
statutes are perfectly valid between
the immediate parties or those claim-
ing under them." Knowlton, C. J.,
speaking for the court in John P.
Squires vs. Tellier, supra, in deter-
mining the constitutionality of the
Massachusetts sales act, says: "A
sale made in violation of the statute
is void only as against creditors, and,
if the vendor's debts are paid, the
sale cannot be interfered with. A
purchaser, to be safe, has. only to see
that the vendor's creditors are pro-
vided for. The vendor may sell free-
ly, without regard to the statute, if
he pays his debts. The Legislature
when contemplating this legislation,
had occasion to consider and balance
against each other the general right
of property owners to make con-
tracts and dispose of their property,
and the general right of creditors to
be paid, and to have reasonable op-
portunities secured to them for the
collection of their debts."
This construction of the Bulk
Sales Law is in perfect harmony
with the construction put upon the
Statutes 13 and 27 Elizabeth, and
similar statutes in this country,
which declare "utterly void" every
conveyance of goods and chattels as
well as land, made with intent to de-
lay, hinder and defraud creditors,
etc. Such statutes are uniformly
construed as using the word "void"
to mean voidable, and voidable only
at the instance of the creditor. Save
for the protection given to creditors
to avoid them, these conveyances and
contracts are perfectly valid as be-
twen the parties themselves. 12 R. C.
L. 473 and 597. And in consonance
with this uniform rule, that contracts
and conveyances made in actual
fraud of creditors are voidable only
at the instance of defrauded credit-
ors, and otherwise are perfectly le-
gal and valid between the parties,
such contracts will be enforced be-
tween the parties. Neither party
will be permitted to plead his fraud
upon creditors to avoid such con-
tracts when executed, or to plead
such fraud as a defense to the en-
forcement of such contract when ex-
ecutory. The following cases are cit-
ed in support of the proposition that
executory contracts will be enforced
between the parties, and that fraud
upon creditors may not be plead as a
defense: I Blackf. (Ind.) 262;
Springer vs. Drosch, 32 Ind. 486-2
Am. Rep. 356; Nichols vs. Patten, 18
Me. 231-36 Am. Dec. 713; Butler vs.
Moore, 73 Me. 151-40 Am. Rep. 348;
Carperter vs. McClure, 39 Vt. 9-91
Am. Dec. 370; Harvey vs. Varney, 98
Mass. 118; Stillings vs. Turner, 153
Mass. 534-27 N. E. 671; Bradtfelt
vs. Cooke, 27 Oreg. 194-40 Pac. 1-50
Am. St. Rep. 701; Bush vs. Rogers,
65 Ga. 320-38 Am. Rep. 785; Sewell
vs. Norris, 128 Ga. 824-58 S. E. 637-
13 L. R. A. (NE) 1118; Clemmens
vs. Clemmens, 28 Wis. 637 -9 Am.
Rep. 520; Sickman vs. Lapsley, 13
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Serg. & R. (Pa.) 224-15 Am. Dec.
596; Williams vs. Williams, 34 Pa.
St.312; Evans vs. Dravo, 24 Pa. St.
62--62Am.Dec.359; Newsonvs. Doug-
las, 7 .Harris & J. (Md.) 417-16 Am.
Dec. 317; Elmore vs. Elmore, 22 Ky.
856-58 S. W. 980; Gary vs. Jacobson,
55 Miss. 204-30 Am. Rep. 514; Bar-
wick vs. Royse, 74 Miss. 415-21 So.
238-60 Am. St. Rep. 512; Landwirth
vs. Shaphran, 47 La. Ann. 336-16 So.
836; Sauter vs. Leveredge, 103 Mo.
615-15 S. W. 981; Davis vs. Mitchell,
34 Cal. 81; Lawton vs. Gordon, 34
Cal. 36; Note: 30 Am. Rep. 517; 12
R. C. L. 613, par. 123.
This formidable array of decisions
is presented here not only to sustain
the rule stated, but to controvert the
adverse holding which we shall have
occasion to consider. The rule as
above stated is in perfect accord
with all legal and equitable maxims
and principles. Under this rule no
distinction is made between execu-
tory and, executed contracts entered
into in fraud of creditors, for neither
the common-law nor the statute of
Elizabeth makes such distinction.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in
Springer vs. Drosch, supra, in an
opinion strongly fortified in reason,
principle and precedent, holds "that
the defense attempted in this case
cannot avail the defendant (name-
ly: that plaintiff may not recover the
purchase price of merchandise sold
to defendant because the sale was in-
tended to defraud creditors )-that
a contract for the sale or conveyance
of property, to hinder or delay cred-
itors, is only illegal as to creditors;
and that as between the parties, and
as to all others, it is a legal and valid
sale or conveyance, and can be en-
forced in all its terms as any other
contract." In Sickman vs. Lapsley
(Pa.), supra, the court says: "In
Reichert vs. Castator, 5 Binn. 6 Am.
Dec. 402, it was decided that an in-
strument, however fraudulent as to
creditors, as to the party is binding
and valid, and neither in courts of
law nor equity would he be permited
to aver against his own voluntary
iniquity. A man shall not be per-
mitted to set up his -iniquity as a de-
fense any more than as a cause" of
action. Montifori vs. Montifori, I.
W. Bl. 363. Fraud is irrevocable as
to him who commits it. I Fomb. 164."
What is said by the Supreme Court
of Main in Butler vs. Moore, supra,
is quite pertinent here: "It is gener-
ally true that the law will not aid
parties violating its express or im-
plied rules, in executing their unlaw-
ful contracts, or afford them relief
from their effects when executed. In
such cases the old maxims, ex turpi
causa and in par! delicto, stand like
stone walls against the parties. The
implication of the statute of 13 Eliz.
declares that as between the parties
to a conveyance made to prevent
creditors of the grantor from attach-
ing or seizing his property and there-
by securing their debts, the transac-
tion is not to be regarded void or
voidable, but valid. And if valid we
fail to see why the note given in pay-
ment is not also valid. The transac-
tion is not a turpis causa, and neither
do the parties stand in pari delicto.
In the case at bar each of the parties
deliberately entered into the contract.
Each receivd a full consideration,
the one for his land and the other for
his note. Neither of them was de-
frauded. So far as their intention
backed up by their acts affected any
creditor of the grantor, the creditor
thereby defrauded has full remedy
etc." The distinction between illeg-
al contracts, to which the doctrine
in pan delicto applies, and contracts,
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which creditors may avoid for fraud,
and to which that doctrine does not
apply, is clearly stated in Gary vs.
Johnson, supra, as follows: "What
sound principle demands that the
fraudulent vendee shall be allowed
to remain in possession of the prop-
erty conveyed, and refuse to pay the
price agreed on? The transaction is
harmful only to the creditors of the
vendor. If they do not complain-if
they acquiesce-why should he be
permitted to escape payment of his
ill-gotten gains? There is a manifest
distinction between conveyances in
fraud of creditors, and offences
against the penal law. By one the
body politic, the sovereign Common-
wealth, is wronged; by the other,
those only who have an interest in
undoing the fraud."
All he foregoing cases are author-
ity for sustaining appellant's assign-
,nent that the trial court erred in
overruling the demurrer to defend-
ant's second paragraph of answer.
There is however, some conflict in the
decisions of the courts on the sub-
ject of the enforcement of executory
contracts made in fraud of creditors.
And since some of these cases give a
semblance of support to appellee's po-
sition, we are constrained to give
them careful, critical consideration.
The case which is chiefly respon-
sible for the conflict is Nellis vs Clark
4 Hill (N. Y.) 427-20 Wend. 30.
(1847.) By a vote of ten against nine
judges and senators, this case, as sub-
seluently declared by the New York
court itself, Moseley vs. Moseley, 15
N.Y. 335, departed from the rule
firmly established by the uniform de-
cisions of this country and England
"that contracts and conveyances
made with a view to hinder, delay
and defraud creditors were neverthe-
less valid and binding between the
parties to such contracts and convey-
ances," the English statute of frauds,
Eliz. 13 and 27, as well as that of
New York itself, pronouncing such
contracts and conveyances "void and
of no effect only, as against the per-
son or persons who might in any wise
be disturbed, hindered or defrauded."
And to sustain this departure, this
case of Nellis vs. Clark gives coun-
tenance to four distinct judicial er-
rors, namely: first, failing to make
distinction between contracts legal in
every respect but voidable only as to
creditors injuriously affected, and
contracts which are really illegal be-
tween the parties because the subject
matter or consideration is unlawful-
in short, making no distinction be-
tween illegal and voidable contracts;
second, applying tovoidable contracts
the doctrine in pan delicto which ap-
plies only to illegal contracts and to
wrongful trnsactions of both parties
which plaintiff pleads as his cause of
action; third, declaring that execu-
tory contracts in fraud of creditors
are illegal at common-law, although
the Statute of Elizabeth which the
court expressly admits is declaratory
of the common-law, pronounces such
contracts void only as to creditors;
and fourth, judicially legislating an
amendment to the ancient Statute of
Elizabeth as well as to the similar
statute forNewYorkby declaring (to
use the court's own language) that
"the word only, as used in the Stat-
utes of Elizabeth, and in our Revised
Statutes of 1787, on this subject, was
not intended to render contracts of
that character legal and valid be-
tween the parties thereto. But it
was inserted to prevent the general
provisions of the Statute from chang-
ing the common-law rule as between
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the parties themselves in relation to
e.;ecitted contracts." See Moseley vs.
R~ipra.
Not only does Nellis vs. Clark sus-
tain itself in these violated principles
of law and equity, but for authority
it relies solely upon the case of Smith
vs. Hubbs, 10 Me. 71, a case which,
as declared in Harvey vs. Varney,
(Mass.) supra, was at that very time
in effect overruled by the Supreme
Court of Maine itself in the case of
Nichols vs. Patten, 18 Me. 231-36 Am.
Dec. 713; and later was expressly dis-
credited in Butler vs. Moore, 73 Me.
151-40 Am. Rep. 348. Finally, so
much of Nellis vs. Clark as survives
its own inherent weakness, falls un-
der the strong dissenting opinion of
Chief Justice Nelson, who afterwards
served as a justice of the United
States Supreme Court. And the case
is also thoroughly discredited and
rejected in well considered opinions
of the supreme courts of the follow-
ing states in their respective cases,
all cited above, to-wit: Indiana,
Springer vs. Drosch; Vermont, Car-
penter vs. McClure; Massachusetts.
Harvey vs. Varney; Wisconsin, Cle-
ments vs. Clements; Maine, Butler
vs. Moore; Oregon, Bradtfelt vs.
Cook; Mississippi, Gary vs. Johnson.
These are the cases which expressly
disapprove. Nellis vs. Clark and
Smith vs. Hubbs. There are deci-
.ions of other states which condemn
the doctrine announced by these
cases. See the numerous citations
, fpr'.
Unfortunately, however, there are
a few courts which have perfunctor-
ily cited these discredited and over-
ruled cases in support of sim-
ilar decisions, apparently with-
out consideration of their char-
acter, and without a knowledge
of the adverse authorities. Such are
the decisions in Goudy vs. Gebhart, 1
Ohio, St. 262; Miller vs. Marckle, 21
Ill. 152; Church vs. Muir, 33 N. J. L.
318 (by 4 of 7 judges) ; Harvin vs.
Weeks, II Rich. L. (S. C.) 601, (3
judges affirming, 2 dissenting and 1
obsent.) Three other cases give ex-
pression to the same erroneous doc-
trine, also failing to distinguish be-
tween illegal and voidable contracts
and mistaking the common-law. They
aretheoldcases of Norris vs. Norris,
9 Dana (Ky.) 317-35 Am. Dec. 138;
Hamilton vs. Scull, 25 Mo. 165-69 Am.
Dec. 460; and Powell vs. Inman, 53
N. C. 436-82 Am. Dec. 426. Each of
these cases is fully reported on one
page or two pages of the official re-
ports, and has little or no authority
or discussion of principle in its sup-
port. In the indiscriminate citation
of cases on this subject there are cer-
Lain overruled decisions which are
made to cast apparent support to the
Nellis vs. Clark doctrine. They are
Welby vs. Armstrong, 21 Ind. 481
and Heath vs. Van Cott, 9 Wis. 516,
which are overruled respectively by
Springer vs. Drosch (Ind.) and
Clemmens vs. Clemmens (Wis.),
both cited above.
These overruled cases, and others
withoit citation of authority or prin-
eipi in their support, as well as the
cases of Nellis vs. Clark and Smith
vs. Hubbs and those which follow
them, are considered by us, not only
becaoise they controvert the rule an-
nounced herein, but also to show the
uncertainty, confusion, conflict and
judicial error occasioned through
thei, misuse and improper recogni-
tion by careless courts, note writers
and text authors. Thus in the note
to 82 Am. Dec. 428, many strong
cases from the best jurisdictions are
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cited in support of the rule that the
defendant may not plead fraud
against creditors as a defense to an
executory contract because such con-
tract is valid and binding between
the parties themselves; yet there are
cited (not considered) all the forego-
ing dead, anaemic and constitution-
ally weak cases, together with a few
others of their progeny in the same
states, and with still others that bear
no relation by blood or affinity to
these cases, having to do solely with
executed contracts, then the note-
writer, obviously believing that in
numbers there is sometimes strength,
states his deduction that the weight
of authority sustains the contrary
rule. Of the real and sustained au-
thorities cited in the note the great
majority as well as weight support
the rule herein announced.
Such has been the confusion, con-
flict and misleading effect of the ad-
judicated cases on this subject mat-
ter of the enforcible character of
executory contracts in fraud of cre-
ditors, that even Ruling Case Law,
otherwise so excellent and reliable a
general authority presents three
stated deductions on the subject
which are in irreconcilable conflict.
The statutes, 13 and 27 Eliz., apply
to conveyances of personal property
as well as land, (12 R.C..L. 468,) and
include all forms of executory con-
tracts, such as judgments, mortgages
deeds of trust, bonds, notes, etc., as
well as executed conveyances (12 R.
C.L. 470). Now, these contracts with-
out exception, executory as well as
executed, are perfectly legal and
binding between the parties and en-
forcible as such; par. 7, pg. 473, and
par. III, pg. 597 of 12 R.C.L.; or they
are illegal for fraud upon creditors,
and as such, unenforcible between
the parties; par. 120, pg. 610 of 12
R.C.L. They cannot be both legal
and illegal at the same time. They
cannot be valid and binding under
the substantive law, and at the same
time unenforcible in the procedural
law. Or, again, such contracts and
conveyances may not be enforcedl, and
"the fraud may be sel up as an ab-
solute defense," par. 120, Pg. 610,
supra, or, they may be enforced, the
fraud "being unavailable by way of
defense." par. 123, pg. 613 of 12 R.
C.L.. They cannot be unenforcible
and enforcible at the same time. The
fraud cannot be set up as a defense in
one case and be unavailing as a de-
fense in a similar case. There can be
no compromise with error. The text
statement in par. 120, pg. 12 R.C.L.
is utterly inconsistent with the other
twostatementsmentioned. The state-
ment declares that "if a contract is
made for the transfer of property to
defraud the creditors of the trans-
feror, the contract while executory,
cannot be enforced either in equity
or at law. The fraud may be set up
as an absolute defense." This is not
the law, is contrary to the great
weight of authority, and is nQt sus-
tained by the cases cited, presumably
in its support. This is simply a state-
ment of the erroneous doctrine an-
nounced in Nellis vs. Clark, and has
little more than this case to warrant
it. That it is not and never was the
law, but is a mere departure in New
York, is clearly established by the
case of Moseley vs. Moseley, 15 N.Y.
335, which says: "It was formerly
understood to be the law that con-
tracts and conveyances made with a
view to hinder, delay or defraud cre-
ditors were nevertheless valid and
binding between the parties to such
contracts and conveyances. The Eng-
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lish statute of frauds, which was
early re-enacted in this State, in de-
claring the effect of such transactions
pronounced them void and of no ef-
fect only as against the person or
persons who might in any wise be
disturbed. hindered or defrauded. In
Nellisvs. Clark the rule was departed
from by a decision which restricted
the doctrine to executed conveyances,
the court holding that an executory
agreement entered into in fraud of
creditors could not be enforced be-
tween the parties; conceding, how-
ever, that the principle which I have
stated applied universally to grants
and conveyances, and all executed
contracts. The court applies to trans-
actions fraudulent against creditors
the rule which prevails as to other il-
legal contracts, namely, that what-
ever the parties have illegally con-
tracted to execute, neither can by
law compel the other to execute, or to
pay damages for not executing; and
that as to conveyances and other exe-
cuted contracts, it refuses to aid eit-
her party, but leaves them where it
finds them. This modification of the
law as it was finally held, having, re-
ceived the sanction of the Court of
Errors, should now be considered as
established." It is quite apparent
that the New York Court itself, re-
luctantly and by force of stare de-
cisis, follows the case of Nellis vs.
Clark in its radical departure from
the long established English and
American common-law rule.
That it is not and never was the
law is also established by the great
preponderance of decisions, from the
States as well as England. To the
array of cases cited in the foregoing
opinion might be added many more
from the same jurisdictions and oth-
ers. In the very best note to be found
in the American Selected Case Sys-
tem of Reports, that to Gary vs.
Johnson, 30 Am. Rep. 520, at the
conclusion of three and a half pages
of critical review of the many early
decisions on the subject, the author
says: "It will be seen that the prin-
cipal case (Gary vs. Johnson, enforc-
ing executory contract which defend-
ant alleged was in fraud of plaintiff's
creditors) is well supported by au-
thority. Indeed, there is considera-
ble numerical preponderance of
States in its favor, and considering
the 'English doctrine and the great
authority of Massachusetts, and the
almost equal division of the judges
iL Nellis vs. Clark in this State (N.
Y.), it must be confessed that upon
authority the case is well decided. In
principle, also, the reasons for its
doctrine are very cogent." The au-
thor does say, however, -that "the
question can hardly be said to be
well settled." And we may say that
this unsettled condition is to be
found in those few states which have
erroneously, and sometimes unwit-
tingly, committed themselves to this
Nellis vs. Clark departure, and have
refused to overrule the error. In Il-
linois, instead of the case of Miller
vs. Marckle, supra, see Fitzgerald vs.
Forrestal, 48 Ill. 228 and Davis vs.
Ransom, 26 Ill. 105; instead of the
case of Church vs. Muir (N. J.)
supra, see Owens vs. Owens, 23 N. J.
Eq. 60, and Stillwell vs. Stillwell, 47
N. J. Eq. 275-20 Atl. 960-24 Am. St.
Rep. 408; instead of Norris vs. Nor-
ris (Ky.), supra, see Elmore vs. El-
more, 22 Ky. 856-58 S. W. 980, and
Ives vs. Jenkins, 7 Ky. L. R. 408; in-
stead of Hamilton vs. Scull, (Mo.),
supra, see Moore vs. Thompson, 6
Mo., 353, and Sauter vs. Leveredge,
103 Mo. 615-15 S. W. 981; instead of
Harvin vs. Weeks, (S. C.), supra,
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see Sunnie vs. Murphy, 2 Hill (S. C.)
488; instead of the case of Walker vs.
McConnico, 40 Yerg. (Tenn.) 228,
see Ins. Co. of Tenn. vs. Waller, 116
Tenn. I- 95 S. W. 11-115 Am. St.
Rep. 763-7 Ann. Cas. 1078.
Not only isthetext statement under
consideration contrary to the great
weight of authority, American as
well as English, but it is not support-
ed by the cases cited. Of the four-
teen cases cited by the text, presum-
ably to sustain it, only five of them
lend it any support at all; five of them
are against the text, and four are ut-
terly without application. Of the
five cases supporting the text, Nor-
ris vs. Norris (Ky.) and -Powell vs.
Inmann (N. C.) are the one and two
page early decisions without support
of case, principle, or reasoning, to
which we have already adverted. The
others are the ancient Nevada case of
McCausland vs. Ralston, 28 Am. Rep.
781, and two Illinois cases, Tyler vs.
Tyler,-126 Ill. 525-21 N. E. 616:9 Am.
St. Rep. 642, and Kirkpatrick vs.
Clark, 132 I1. 342-24 N. E. 71-22 Am.
St. Rep. 531-8 L.R.A. 511. All three
of the latter decisions are founded ex-
pressly upon the cases of Nellis vs.
Clark and Smith vs. Hubbs, and rise
no higher in authority. These two
Illinois decisions are not only found-
ed on Smith vs. Hubbs (Me.) which
was expressly overruled in Maine it-
self, and Nellis vs. Clark (N. Y.)
which was based on Smith vs. Hubbs
after that case had been overruled,
but the second of the Illinois cases
adds another overruled case to its
support. In Kirkpatrick vs. Clark,
the court says: "In Harrison vs.
Hatcher, 44 Ga. 638, the precise
question before us was presented, and
we are disposed to concur with the
conclusion reached by the court in
that case." And yet three Georgia
cases overrule that decision. Sewall
vs. Norris (Ga.) supra, concludes its
opinion thus: "See Parrott vs. Baker,
82 Ga. 364-9 S. E. 1068, where the
case of Harrison vs. Hatcher, 44 Ga.
638, decided by two judges, was over-
ruled," calling attention also to Beard
vs. White, 120 Ga. 1048-48 S.E. 400,
which approves Parrott vs. Baker
and expressly confirms the overruling
of Harrison vs. Hatcher. Tyler vs.
Tyler, follows the early case of Mil-
ler vs. Marckle (Ill.) supra, which
cites Smith vs. Hubbs and Nellis vs.
Clark as authority; and Kirkpatrick
vs. Clark follows Tyler vs. Tyler, and
adds to its citation of Smith vs Hubbs
and Nellis vs. Clark, the thrice over-
ruled case of Harrison vs. Hatcher.
Such, unfortunately, is the character
of the Illinois cases, and the support
they give the text.
There are four cases cited for the
text which are positively against it:
Sewall vs. Norris (Ga.) Butler vs.
Moore (Me.) Bradtfelt vs. Cooke
(Ore.) and Carpenter vs. McClure,
(Vt.) all cited to sustain our opinion.
The first case overrules the Georgia
decision which the Illinois case, also
cited for the text, approves. The
other three cases, as we have already
shown, expressly disapprove and re-
ject Smith vs. Hubbs and Nellis vs.
Clark, and all four of these cases sus-
tain the right to recover on execu-
tory contracts and deny3 the right of
the defendant to plead his own fraud
upon creditors as a bar to recovery.
The fifth case cited which is
against the text is Williams vs Clink,
90 Mich. 297-51 N.W. 453-30 Am.
St. Rep. 443. This is also relied on
by appellee, but is against his posi-
tion. To an action of replevin found-
ed on a chattel mortgage held by
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plaintiif, the defendant plead that the
mortgage was without consideration,
(not that it was given to defraud cre-
ditors.) The court instructed the
jury that defendant was not estop-
ped from recovering on his plea of
want of consideration, even if the
jury found that the mortgage had
been executed in fraud of creditors.
This instruction, which plaintiff took
exception to, was approved on appeal.
This case decides that defendant's
plea of want of consideration is good,
but it does not decide that the fraud
against creditors is a defense to the
executory contract. No such defense
was plead or proven in the case, and
judgment for defendant was revers-
ed and plaintiff was granted a new
trial for the second prosecution of his
case on his executory contract. The
question of fraud was decided on the
sole authority of Judge vs. Vogle, 38
Mich. 569, and this decision by Judge
Cooley very emphatically states the
rule that it is the sole right of credit-
ors to plead that contracts and con-
veyances were made to defraud them;
that it is a fraud which concerns only
their own interest and in no manner
affects the parties as between them-
selves. Judge Cooley says: "A mort-
gage fraudulent as against creditors
may be avoided at their option; but
how the intended fraud upon them
can give it validity as to others is not
explained in the briefs. The right
of the creditors is to defeat it: but
there seems to be no necessary rela-
tion between the right of one man to
defeat it as a fraud upon him, and the
right of another man to affirm it be-
cause of the same fraud. The fraud
which should give one rights must
be a fraud which in some way con-
cerns his own interest." This deci-
sion of Judge Cooley is in perfect ac-
cord with another rendered by him,
Beecher vs. Marquette & Pac. Ry. Co.
(Mich.) cited in the early part of this
opinion, holding that statutes declar-
ing certain contracts void for the
benefit of third persons are fully sat-
isfied when such persons are given
the right to avoid them. The state-
ment in the main case that "if the
contract is executory, it will not be
enforced," is pure obiter, is erron-
eous, has no relation to the decided
case and is made with reference to
the case of Bassett vs Shepards on
which the court was commenting
and which has to do with an executed
conveyance sought to be set aside on
the ground that it was in fraud of
creditors.
Four cases cited in support of the
text have to do with executed con-
veyances, actual transfers of proper-
ty made between the parties to de-
fraud creditors. These cases are
Gravier vs. Carraby, 17 La. 118-36
Am. Dec. 608; Brady vs. Huber, 197
Ill. 291-64 N. E. 264-90 Am. St. Rep.
161; Leger vs. Doyle, 11 Rich. L.
(S. C.) 109-70 Am.. Dec. 240; and
McClintock vs. Loisseau, 31 W. Va:
865-8 S. E. 612-2 L. R. A. 816. These
were actions to recover property ac-
tually conveyed. Such conveyances
are perfectly legal between the par-
ties, and may be set aside only by the
defrauded creditors. Neither party
will be permitted by law or equity to
plead his own fraud upon creditors
as a ground for avoiding such con-
veyance. This is the universal rule,
and such cases have no application
whatever to the text statement thai
executory contracts in fraud of cred-
iors cannot be enforced, and that de-
fendant may plead such fraud as a
defence. The cases of Rich vs. Hays,
99 Me. 51-58 tl. 62, In re Simmons
Estate, 20 Pa. 450, and Surlott vs.
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Beddon, 19 Ky. 109, cited by appelle
are of this character and do not sup-
port appellee's case.
The true rule which should apply
to the rights of parties arising out (f
executory contracts made in fraud
of creditors is as stated in 12 R. C. L.
613, par. 123. After stating that the
cases are not harmonious, this au-
thority says: "The general principle
undoubtedly is that that party must
fail whose case is incomplete without
proof of the fraud. 13. Accordingly
many cases have permitted recovery
under such circumstances, the fraud
not being a necessary ingredient of
theplaintiff's case, and beingunavail-
able by way of defense, -14, though in
some cases the courts have refused
to enforce such obligations 15." In
connection with the last clause,
which indicates the exception to the
general rule, Ruling Case Law, might
well cite Smith vs. Hubbs and Nellis
vs. Clark, and their kind; and then
eliminate from par. 120, pg. 610,
Vol. 12, the inconsistent and mislead-
ing statement.
The courts which refuse to enforce
executory contracts between the par-
ties because creditors are given the
right to avoid them, lose themgelves
in the sound of the familiar saying,
that "equity will leave such parties
where it finds them? But do such
courts leave the parties where they
find them? Indeed they do not.
They neither leave them where they
find them nor find them where
they leave them. There is only
one way to find a party in law
or equity, and that is by his pleading.
His pleading alone determines
whether he comes into court "with
the metaphorical unclean hands,"
whether his action is founded on an
illegal contract or transaction, or in
his own wrong, or whether he vio-
lates the maxim ex turpi causa, nulla
actio oritur. And to these cases, and
to these alone, applies the doctrine
in pari delicto potior est conditio de-
fendentis. Upon the filing of a de-
murrer to the plaintiff's declaration,
complaint or bill which discloses any
of the foregoing elements, the court
immediately will sustain the demur-
rer and refuse all affirmative relief to
either party, even though the defen-
dant be in the equal fault with the
plaintiff. Therefore, it is said that
in such case the position of the defen-
dent is the better. But in the appel-
lant's case, as in every case founded
on an executory contract made in
fraud of creditors, 'the fraud not be-
ing a necessary ingredient in the
plaintiff's case," the plaintiff pleads
a good declaration, complaint or bill
upon an executory contract, as a bill
of sale, note, bond, mortgage, djeed of
trust or judgment. From this plead-
ing as its guide the court finds that
plainiff appears with clean hands,
that his action is not founded upon
any illegality or wrong, and Ahat,
instead .of violating the maxim ex
turpi causa nulla actio oritur, he
pleads a perfect cause of action
which, upon prima facie proof, en-
titles him to a judgment at law for
damages or a decree in equity for re-
cission against the defendant for
breach of the contract.
Where does the court find the de-
fendant in such case? It finds him,
first of all, liable to the plaintiff in
the well plead cause of action, based
on a perfectly legal contract between
them, and in a situation to which the
doctrine in pari delieto does not ap-
ply for the obvious reason that the
parties cannot be in the equal fault
in a case where no fault of the plain-
tiff appears either in the pleading or
proof of the case. It finds that plain-
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tiff's position in the case is better
than that of the defendant, for de-
fendant's demurrer to plaintiff's
cause of action must be overruled
and defendant must assume the bur-
den of pleading and proving a good
defense in his own behalf to avoid his
liability to the plaintiff.
There is but one way in which the
court can leave these parties where
it finds them, and that is by the appli.
cation of the general principle or
rule stated is 12 R. C. L. pg. 613, par.
123, "that that party must fail whose
case is incomplete without proof of
the fraud," and, therefore, by a deci-
sion for the plaintiff, whose cause of
action has in its pleadingandproof no
ingredient of fraud, and against the
defendant who has nothing to offer
in defense of himself, but who seeks
instead to plead a cause of action in
behalf of creditors (not parties to
the action) on the ground of his own
fraud upon them. The best courts
and the majority of jurisdictions, in
this manner, actually leave the par-
ties where they find them.
Where do those courts which
apply the erroneous doctrine leave
the parties? First, they violate the
maxim ex turpi causu, nulla actio ori-
tir by permitting the defendant to
plead his own wrong as a defense,
which he may not do any more than
the plaintiff may plead his own
wrong as a cause of action. Monte-
fori vs. Montefori, I W Black. 464,
Lord Mansfield; Evans vs. Dravo, 24
Pa. St. 62-62Am. Dec. 359. Second,
they violate the jurisdictional maxim
of equity by courting the defendant
with his unclean hands. Third, they
erroneously apply the doctrine, in
pa,' delicto, to a contract voidable
only by creditors and containing no
illegality at all as between the par-
ties themselves. Fourth, they violate.
all rules of pleading by sustaining a
plea or answer which states no facts
whatever in defendant's own behalf
to bar the plaintiff's recovery on the
good cause of action stated, but
which, instead, states facts to consti-
tute a cause of action in behalf of
creditors against the defendant him-
self on the ground of his own fraud
upon them. Fifth, they wrongfully
permit the defendant to make of the
Statute of Elizabeth (and the Bulk
Sales Law) a shield to protect him-
self in the possession of the plaintiff's
property while at the same time re-
sisting the just payment of the pur-
chase price which he has legally con-
tracted to pay, thereby lending their
actice, aid to defendant to perpetrate
a greater injury and fraud upon
plaintiff than any fraud upon credit-
ors that might be involved in the
transaction. Sixth, these courts vio-
late the maxims that "Equity follows
the law" and that there is no wrong
without a remedy, by denying to
plaintiff his judgment or decree on a
perfectly plead right of action, and
by destroying the contract which, by
the very decisions of these very
courts themselves, is perfectly legal
and binding between the parties, and
supject to attack only by creditors
under these statutes. 12 R. C. L. pg.
473, par. 7, and pf. 597, par. 111, and
pf.525, par. 54.
And, in this manner, do these
courts actually leave the parties
where they find them not.
What defense to the executory con-
tract on which he is sued does the de-
fendant plead? Not illegality, for by
all the authorities and decisions of
all the jurisdictions such contracts,
though made in fraud of creditors.
are perfectly legal and binding be-
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tween the parties. 12 R. C. L., last
cited. Not want of consideration,
for defendant holds in his hands the
stock of goods, the lands, or the chat-
tels for which the note, mortgage, or
bill of sale in suit was given. It is
otherwise,of course, if there is in
fact no consideration, unless essoppel
applies. Williams vs. Clink (Mich.)
supra; Owens vs. Owens (N. J.) su-
pra. Not fraud, for fraud without
injury is not available as a defense
even in equity. Myer .vs. Yesser, 42
Ind. 294; See, Chapin on Torts, 416.
And a defendant cannot be injured
by a fraud which he himself is guilty
of. In this case the defendant does
not even allege that he himself has
been defrauded, but that certain
creditors have been defrauded. If
this be a good defense, then is it a
good defense for the adult to plead
the infancy of the other party to the
contract, or for the principal of a
note to plead as his defense the re-
lease of the surety.
Evans vs. Dravo (Pa.) supra, was
an action on a bond for $2500, pur-
porting to be the purchase price for
land sold by plaintiff to defendant.
Defendant was permitted to 'prove
that the bond was executed to de-
fraud plaintiff's wife and to secure
her signature to the deed. The
court in reversing the case said: "At
law nothing but payment would dis-
charge the bond; and if the defend-
ant is relieved by the facts alleged
it must be by the interposition of
equity. The plaintiff needs no aid
from equity-he stands on his legal
rights * * * * The defendant is
in the posture of a party in a court
of equity asking that plaintiff shall
be restrained from asserting his le-
gal remedies * * * * Would a
chancellor listen to a party seeking
relief from the consequences of his
own fraud? Never. He would tell
him that he who hath committed
iniquity shall never have equity; *
* * * and that no man shall be
received to allege his own turpitude.
The maxim of the common law is to
the same effect, ex dolo malo non
oritur actio. And no man * * **
shall set up his own iniquity as a de-
fense any more than as a cause of
action. But it is insisted that the
plaintiff was in pari delicto, and that
the maxims apply to him and his ac-
tion as well as to the defendant. That
ie was a party to the fraud practiced
on his wife is not to be doubted, since
the verdict has established it; but if
he needs no assistance from the
fraud to make out his case, if he have
a perfect cause of action without it, it
is apprehended these maxims do not
apply to him. 'The test,' says Judge
Duncan, * *"' 'whether a demand
connected with an illegal transaction
is capable of being enforced at law is
whether the plaintiff requires the aid
of the illegal transaction to establish
his case. If the plaintiff cannot open
his case without showing that he has
broken the law, the court will not
assist him, whatever his claim in jus-
tice may be upon the defendant.' * "
• But what need has her husband's
action of support from that part of
the transaction? Obviously none
whatever. And yet the root of the
defense is ir it. Without it the
plaintiff has a perfect case; without
it the defendant has not a shadow of
defense. Then, according to the test
of Judge Duncan, the plaintiff is uri-
affected by the fraud, though a party
to it, while upon the maxims, both of
law and equity, the defense should
have been excluded. There is noth-
ing novel in this principle. We ap-
ply it continually to voluntary con-
vekances,and to contracts made to
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defraud creditors, which, though
void as to them, are good and binding
as between the immediate parties:
Hartley vs. McAnulty, 4 Yeates 95
(2 Am. Dec. 396) ; Reichart vs. Cas-
tator, 5 Binn. 112 (6 Am. Dec. 402) ;
and the cases collected by Hare and
Wallece, in I Smith's Lead. Cas. 59,
note".
If actual fraud upon creditors may
not be set up as a defense between
the parties themselves to a good cause
of action plead by the plaintiff, cer-
tainly mere constructive fraud upon
creditors, such as created by the Bulk
Sales Law, also may not be availa-
ble as a defense. The numerous
cases cited in the early part of the
opinion are authority upon this pro-
position as well the stated construc-
tion that the Bulk Sales Act merely
makes voidable at the instance of the
creditors themselves contracts and
sales in bulk, and does not in any
manner affect their validity as be-
tween the parties.
This was squarely decided in the
case of Escalle vs. Mark, (Nev.) 183
Pac. 387. A judgment was rendered
for the plaintiff in an action to recov-
er the purchase price of a bulk sale
of property. The case was between
the buyer and seller themselves on
their contract. The defendant, pur-
chaser, appealed from the judgment.
The court on appeal stated that "The
only point urged upon our considera-
tion as a reason why the judgment
and order appealed from should be
reversed is that prior to the making
of the sale section 2 of the 'Bulk Sales
Act' * * * was not complied with."
That section required notice of the
sale to be given to the creditors five
days in advance of the sale, and in
default thereof, that such sale or
transfer shall be fraudulent and
void." The court held that as be-
tween the parties themselves this law
had no application; that the statute
merely made such sales voidable as
to creditors themselves, and then
only at their own instance or action.
The court denied the plba of the de-
fendant and affirmed the judgment.
Two cases are relied upon by ap-
pellee as sustaining the contention
that the sale in violation of the Bulk
Sales Law is void; Kett vs. Masker,
(N. J.) 90 Atl. 243, and Farrer vs.
Lonsby Lbr. & Coal Co., 149 Mich.
118-112 N. W. 726. In the former
case a purchaser brought replein to
recover a stock of goods taken in at-
tachment by- creditors of the seller.
It was therefore an action against
the creditors, and not an action be-
tween the palties. Of course, the
sale is void in every action by or
against creditors, and that is all this
case decides. In Farrer vs. Lonsby
Lbr. & Coal Co., last cited,the plain-
tiff, stock holders, filed suit against
the defendant concern and its officers
for accounting, receiver and injunc-
tion. The defendant had made a
bulk sale of wood and coal to Dalby
& Sarns, and they filed an interven-
ing petition against the receiver,
asking that the notes given by them
forthbulksale purchased be returned,
or that they be declared to have a
lien against the property still held by
the receiver. Creditors of defendant
also intervened. The Dalby &
Sarnes petition was denied, because
it was directed against the creditors,
the court holding that the sale to
Dalby & Sarnes was, as to creditors,
void, not only to convey title but also
to create a lien against the goods.
The court said: Counsel for the pe-
titioning appellants appears to con-
cede that under that act the sale was
void, but claims that the receiver
should eiher return the petitioners'
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notes or pay them with the money
derived from the sale of the goods.
He also contends that the bill of sale
should be treated as a mortgage.
Neither of these contentions can be
sustained. Otherwise a quick and
easy way to completely avoid the
statute would be furnished. A sale
void as to creditors cannot, as be-
tween the parties, be made to operate
to give the vendee a lien for the mon-
ey he has paid (obviously for the
reason that a lien in favor of the
fraudulent purchaser as against the
property would as effectually defeat
the creditors as if such purchaser
took good title by the sale as against
them.) 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law
(2nd Ed.) 189. These petitioners
acted in violation of the law. They
are not before a court of equity with
clean hands. They are not in a posi-
tion to ask for any remedy in a court
of equity." Of course, Dalby &
Sarnes as petitioners are in court
with unclean hands and entitled to
no relief against the creditors-en-
titled to no lien against the very pro-
perty which the creditors may apply
to the payment of their claims
against the seller, despite the bulk
sale of such property to the petition-
ers. Their petition pleads their own
wrong, their own violation of the
statute as the ground for the relief
sought. That the petitioners are in
court with clean hands and that they
may be entitled to the concellation of
their notes as against the defendants
and the present holders of the notes
is clearly indicated by the concluding
language of the court in this case:
"The holders of he notes in uestion
are not now before the court, and
their rights cannot be determined in
this proceeding. If they present their
notes to the court for allowance
against the estate of the company as
indorser, the question will then arise
for determination whether they are
holders in due course and for value."
In other words, if the present holders
of the notes are not bonafide purchas-
ers, the petitioners, as against them
and the payee, to whom the notes
were given in purchase of the goods
in bulk, may have cancellation of
such notes on the ground of the fail-
ure of consideration. This is so for
the reason that as between the par-
ties the Bulk Sales Law has no ap-
plication.
The foregoing construction and
application of the case of Farrer vs
Lonsby Lbr. & Coal Co., et al. is con-
firmed by two recent decisions of the
Supreme Court of Michigan: Al-
bright vs. Stockhill et al., 175 N. W,
252, and Krolik vs. Kacxmarek et al..
175 N. W. 239. Both these cases are
strongly analagous to the case ap-
pealed to this court. Both were suits
to rescind sales in bulk made in
violation of the Bulk Sales Act of
Michigan. In both cases relief was
granted the plaintiffs, and in both
cases the decrees entered by the chan-
cellor were affirmed on ppeal. In
both cases the defendants plead the
violation of the Bulk Sales Act as a
bar to the relief sought, and in both
cases Farrer vs. Lonsby Lbr. & Coal
Co.,was relied on to sustain this con-
tention. Both cases were decided at
the same terir of court on opinions
by-Stone, 5, and these issuesweredis-
posed of in almost identical language,
as follows: "The only question pos-
sessing any merit, that is presented
by the appellant as a reason for re-
versal, is that the case is controlled
by the case of Farrer vs. Lonsby, su-
pra, and that, the parties having
acted in violation of law, the appellee
does not come into court with clean
hands and hence cannot prevail. It
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should be borne in mind that the in-
stant case presents a situation of the
entire failure of consideration for
the sale. The whole trend of our de-
cisions, as well as the decisions of
other courts construing statutes sim-
ilar to our Bulk Sales Law, is to the
effect that the purpose of this, and
similar acts, is to protect creditors.
(Here citing cases). Such sale as be-
tween the seller and buyer is valid;
and if the seller has been guilty of
fraud to the injury of the buyer, or
if there has been an entire failure of
consideration (or grossly inadequate
consideration), the seller cannot
hide behind the statute and thus
avoid liability to the purchaser. What
was held in Farrer vs. Lonsby Lum-
ber & Coal Co., supra, is that a sale
void as to creditors cannot, as be-
tween the parties, be made to operate
to give the.vendee a lien for the mon-
ey he has paid. The remedy sought
in that case was against the proper-
ty (or the proceeds of it) sold in vio-
lation of the Bulk Sales Law. In the
case at bar, the remedy sought by
the vendee in no way affects the
rights of creditors of the seller of the
goods, but is aimed at a recovery
from the seller of the property giver
in exchange for the goods.
The question lies wholly between the
vendor and the vendee, affects cred-
itors not at all, and the doctrine that
one must come into a court of equity
with clean hands in order to obtain
relief has, in our opinion, no applica-
tion. As we have said, it would be
most inequitable to permit the ven-
dor to retain the purchase price o
the stock of goods while subjecting
the stock to the payment of his
debts."
TheBulkSalesActs are in derroga-
tion of the common law and of the
iight to contract and to alienate pro-
perty, and must therefore be strictly
construed. Cooney vs. Sweet, 133
Ga., 511-66 S. E. 257-25 L. R. A.
(NS) 758; Note to Ann. Cas. 1914B,
1105. A construction, such as con-
tended for by appellee in this case,
which would prohibit or penalize or
render void as between the parties
themselves, a sale of merchandise in
bulk, for mere failure to give notice
thereof to the vendor's creditors,
would render the statute itself uncon-
stitutional as in conflict with he pro-
hibition of the fourteenth amendment
to the Federal Constitution, that no
State shall deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law, the freedom to contract,
constituting both liberty and prope-
ty. Off vs. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40-85
N. E. 264-126 Am. St. Rep. 184-20
L. R. A. (NS) 167; Miller vs. Craw-
ford, 70 Ohio St. 207-71, N. E. 631;
Block vs. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387-76
Pac. 22-101 Am. St. Rep. 97g.; Mc-
Kinster vs. Sager, 163 Ind. 671-72 N.
E. 8 4-68 L. R. A. 273-106 Am. St.
Rep. 268; Wright vs. Hart, 182 N.
Y. 330-75 N. E. 404-2 L. R. A. (NS)
338. Subsequent enactments of the
Bulk Sales Law in Indiana and New
York, making possible their construc-
tion as a reasonable exercise of the
police power, have been sustained.
Hirth-Krouse Co., vs. Cowen, 177
Ind. 1-97 N. E. I; Sprintz vs. Saxton,
126 App. Div. 421-110 N. Y. Supp.
585. For cases in other States hold-
ing Bulk Sales Laws constitutional,
see 12 R. C. L. 528; note to 20 L. R.
A. (NS) 160. Not every process
prescribed by act of the legislature
constitutes "due process of law"
Black's Constitutiono;q Law, 572.
Not every interference with the per-
sonal right of contract can be sus-
tained as due process of law in the
exercise of the police power. All-
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geyer vs. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578-17
Sup. Ct. 427-4 L. Ed. 837; Lochner
vs. NewYork,198 U. S. 45-25 Sup-
Ct. 539-49 L. Ed. 937; Adair vs.
United States, 208 U. S. 161-28 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 277-52 L. Ed. 436,
The appellant was entitled to the
relief sought in this case, and for
the error of the trial court in over-
ruling the demurrer to appellee's sec-
ond paragraph of nswer, he judg-
ment is reversed. The cause is re-
manded to the trial court with in-
structions to proceed in accordance
with this oponion.
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Brief for the appellant, John Wag-
ner.
NATURE OF THE SUIT
This is an appeal brought by John
Wagner, plaintiff below, against Na-
than Parker, defendant below, from
a judgment rendered against the ap-
pellant in the Notre Dame Circuit
Court. The appellant brought suit
to rescind an assignment of a land
contract and to cancel a promissory
note by him delivered to the appellee.
The court found for the appellee that
the appellant take nothing by the
suit and that the appellee recover
his costs and accordingly entered a
decree in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff, from which de-
cree the latter prosecutes his appeal
to this honorable court.
WHAT THE ISSUES WERE
Plaintiff filed a complaint in one
paragraph praying a reassignment
of his equity in the land contract and
a cancellation of his note on the
ground of a total failure of consider-
ation. Defendant answered in two
paragraphs: 1st, a general denial.
and, 2nd, the illegality of the con-
tract between the parties. To the
last paragraph the plaintiff interpos-
ed a demurrer, questioning its suffi-
ciency. The demurrer being over-
ruled, plaintiff, saving his exception,
then filed a reply in denial and con-
fession and dvoidance.
Plaintiff filed a motion for a new
trial on the following grounds:
1. The decree was contrary to
law.
2. It was contraly to the evi-
dence introduced.
3. It was clearly against the
weight of the evidence.
4. The court erred in overruling
the plaintiff's motion at the
close of the defendant's evi-
dence to enter a decree in the
former's favor.
5. The court erred in admitting




On the first day of August, 1920,
Nathan Parker owned a grocery
store, consisting of stock and fix-
tures, -located on the corner of Main
and Elm streets, Niles, Mich. John
Wagner was the owner of an equity
in a certain tract of land, to-wit: a
contract for the purchase of the
northeast quarter of the northeast
quarter of Section 22, Sorins Addi-
tion to South Bend. Parker and
Wagner, both residents of South
Bend, on the first day of August,
1920, entered into the following con-
tract for the sale and exchange of
their properties, to-wit:
Contract of Sale and Exchange
This agreement, made and execut-
ed this first day of August, 1920, at
South Bend, Indiana, between Na-
than Parker, party of the first part
and John Wagner, party of the sec-
ond part, WITNESSETH: That' the
party of the first part does hereby
sell, transfer, assign, exchange, set
over, and deliver unto the party of
the second part his grocery store,
consisting of stock and fixtures, lo-
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cated on the ground floor of teh build-
ing, on the corner of Main and Elm
Streets, Niles, Mich., said grocery
store and its contents being more
particularly described in the inven-
tory thereof just completed, which is
hereto attached, referred to, and
made a part of this instrument. And
the said party of the first part, for
himself, his heirs, executors and ad-
ministrators, does covenant and
agree to warrant the sale of the said
property and the title thereof to the
said party of the second part, his
heirs, executors, administrators, and
assigns, and agrees to pay all the
debts against the s.aid property and
said party on account thereof, which
debts now amount to $1,000. In con-
sideration of which the party of the
second part does hereby sell, trans-
fer, msign and deliver over to the par-
ty of the first part all his right, title
and interest-in a certain tract of land
situated in St. Joseph County, as evi-
denced by the contract of purchase
held by the said party of the second
part and this day assigned and deliv-
ered by the second party unto the
party of the first part, which said
contract together with the said as-
signment endorsed thereon is attach-
ed hereto, referred to, and made a
part of this instrument. And, as a
further consideration, the party of
the second hereby executes and de-
livers to the party of the first part
his promissory note of date for $400,
payable in one year, with interest at
6 per ceht per annum, and attorney's
fees, which note is referred to, at-
tached to, and made a part of this
instrument.
Executed in duplicate by the par-
ties this first day of August, 1920, at
South Bend, Indiana, each party re-






Pursuant to the foregoing instru-
ment John Wagner, after delivering
the assigned contract and note, went
into possession of the store at Niles,
Mich.
In Michigan the Bulk Sales Act
was in force, but was entirely ignor-
ed by the parties in their contract,
who made no attempt to comply with
its provisions. After Wagner had
gone into possession of the store, The
National Grocery Company, the
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Com-
pany, and the South Bend Wholesale
Grocery Company, all of South Bend,
Indiana, as creditors having claims
against the vendee, brought action
in the Michigan Court, under the
Bulk Sales Law, took possession of
the stock and fixtures, placed it in the
hands of a receiver, and sold all the
goods to satisfy the claims of the
creditors, which claims aggregated
$1,100. Parker and Wagner were
made defendants to this proceeding
in Michigan. No part of these claims
ws paid by Parker.
On the trial plaintiff introduced
the contract in evidence and testi-
fied that he had fulfilled its terms to
the letter, and that the defendant
had filed to discharge the debts
amounting to $1,000. The defend-
ant's evidence consisted of the fail-
ure to obey the mandates of the Bulk
Sales Law. No attempt was made
by him which tended to show that
the parties had conspired to defeat
the creditors, or were, for other rea-
sons, in pari delicto. As to the facts
alleged by the plaintiff, they were
not denied.
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.
Every statute must be construed
with reference to the object intended
to be accomplished by it.
36 Cyc. 1102.
II
The word "void" in the Bulk Sales
Statutes is to be construed as mean-
ing voidable at the option of credit-
ors.
12 R. C. L. 474, 475.
McGreenery vs. Murphy, 76 N. H.
338, 82 At. 720.
Newman vs. Garfield, 104 At.
881 (Vt.).
Benson vs. Jonson, 165 Pac. 100.
Esca; le vs. Marks, 183 Pac. 387
(Nev.).
Oregon Mill Co. vs. Hyde, 169 Pac.
791.
Schmuicker vs. Lawler, 38 Penn.
Super 578.
The validity of transactions fraud-
ulent as to third persons is subject
to attack, by them alone. They are
in every respect binding upon the
immediate parties.
Gary vs. Jacobson, 30 Am. Rep.
514, 55 Miss. 204.
Gillian vs. Brown, 43 Miss. 641.
Walker vs. Jeffries, 45 Miss. 160.
Elmore vs. Elmore, 58 S. W. 980.
Ives vs. Jenkins, 7 Ky., Law Rep.
408.
Ferguson vs. Dent. 24 Federal 412.
III
IV
Sales in violation of the Bulk Sales
Laws, while voidable at the option of
creditors, are, as between the vendor
and vendee, absolutely valid. This
irregularity cannot be set up by eith-
er party as a ground for rescission
or an excuse for non-performance.
The title to the goods vests absolute-
ly in the purchaser to be defeated
only by the creditors intercession.
Schumacher vs. Lawler, 38 Penn.
Sup. 57.8.
Escalle vs. Marks, 183 Pac. 387.
McGreenery vs. Murphy, 82 At.
720:
12 R. C. L. 474, 525.
Gary vs. Jacobson, 30 Am. Rep.
514, 55 Miss. 204.
Ore, Mill Co., vs. Hyde, 169 Pac.
791.
Newman vs. Garfield, 104 At. 881.
Fergusson vs. Dent, 24 Federal 412
VI
As between the parties, the law of
the actual situs of the owner of the
property at the time of the transfer,
hat is, the law of the place where the
transfer is made (lex loci Contrac-
tus), governs the validity and the ef-
fect of absolute conveyances of per-
sonality, including executed sales. If
valid where made, the sale will be up-
held, as between the parties, in every
jurisdiction in which it may be called
in question; *f invalid where made it
will not be sustained elsewhere. So
executed sales of personality, as be-
tween the parties, are governed by
the.lex loci contractus as their valid-
ity and effect.
Kerr vs. Urie, 37 At. 789.
Marvin Safe Co., vs. Norton, 7 At.
418.
Weinstein vs. Freyer, 9 outh,285.
In re Dalpay, 43 N. W. 564.
Fred Miller Brew. Co., vs. De
France, 57 N. W. 959.
Minor, Conflict of Laws, 293-294.
ARGUMENT
The facts in this case are most
unique. The defense offered by the
defendant is the failure of the par-
ties to make their dealings comport
with the requirements of the Michi-
gan Bulk Sales Law. In his answer
he set out in full the foreign statute.
That the parties owing to a conspir-
acy to defraud creditors, or on ac-
count of some other fact, were in
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pari delicto in their transgression
was not suggested by the erudite
counsel for the defense. He was con-
tent to rely upon the statute. To this
answer the demurrer interposed by
the plainiff was overruled. His mo-
tion for a decree in his favor at the
close of the other side's testimony
met the same fate. It is now my in-
tention to show that the facts con-
tained in the defendant's pleadings
and evidence cannot preclude a re-
covery by the plaintiff.
A short discussion relating to the
interpretation of staties would not
be beside the issue. An elemental
rule of statutory construction is to
first ascertain the purpose the law-
making body had in mind at the time
of the enactment. Once that is found
a definite point is had. The difficulty
encountered in fathoming the pur-
pose of the legislature is greatly de-
creased by giving ample considera-
tion to the former law, its .weaknes-
ses and its evils. What effect is the
new law to have upon the old? What
exigiencies prompted the legislators
to prescribe this change? Is it to
completely abolish or to supplement
the old law that this statute was
passed? The foregoing are a few of
the questions, which when answered
properly, remove the seemingly in-
surmountable obstacles barring the
way towards a definite solution. In
the matter which follows a terse and
accurate statement of the fundamen-
tals of interpretation is contained:
Every statute must be construed
with reference to the object intend-
ed to be accomplished by it. In order
to ascertain the object, it is proper
to consider the occasion and necessi-
ty of its enactment, the defect and
evils of the former law, and the rem-
edy provided by the new one: and the
statute should be given that construc-
tion which is best calculated. to ad-
vance its object.
Now let us consider the Bulk Bales
Statute. The first legislation of this
nature was enacted about thirty
years ago. Since then many states
have passed such an act. Although
such acts have not been accepted
without cavil, their worth has been
proved. By the common law, no
remedy was afforded the creditors of
those disposing of a stock of goods in
bulk other than those allowed to
creditors generally. Under the stat-
ute in question these creditors, while
still in possession of all their common
law rights, have a new and addition-
al protection against their unscrupu-
lous dhbtors. It must be that the
legislature deemed these individuals
to need a special safeguard. But- did
the legislature intend the protection
of these statutes o anyone other than
the pre-existing creditors of the sel-
ler? Only in the negative can this be
answered. At the time of' the pas-
sage of these statutes these credit-
ors were the only individuals in need
of any special relief. When the debt-
or disposed of his stock of goods,
with it went the sole fund to which
they could resort to satisfy their
claims, since the debtor managed to
place the purchase price, if there
should be any, beyond the reach of
creditors. The new statute sought
to eliminate this evil by making it in-
cumbent upon the seller and pur-
chaser to give the creditor, by ample
notice of sale, an opportunity to pro-
tect his interests. All the benefits
resulting from these statutory obli-
gations go to the creditor. No other
person receives anything for comply-
ing with the statute.
The Bulk Sales Law has but one
aim ,namely: to prevent the sale of
goods in bulk until the creditors of
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the seller have been paid in full 12
R. C. L. 525.
In the language of the Bulk Sales
Law, all sales violating its provisions
are to be void, or void and fraudu-
lent, as against creditors of the sel-
ler. A few statutes say they shall be
void, without specifying at whose in-
stance. These have been interpreted
to mean the same as the former.
Now, what is the legal meaning of
these words "void" and "void and
fraudulent?" Does the statute use
the term, "void" in its accepted sense,
i. e., that the sale is absolutely inval-
id at the instance of any person re-
gardless of his status in the transac-
tion? If the question is answered af-
firmatively, we have no standing in
this case whatever, since the law
leaves both parties in such a sale
where it finds them. This, however,
could not be the legal intendment of
the legislators. Since the law was
passed solely for the benefit of cred-
itors, it is only voidable as to them.
They alone can question the validity
of the conveyance. Whether the
transfer is to stand or fall depends
upon their election to pursue their
new remedy. Below are collected
some of the meanings placed upon
the words "void" and "void and
fraudulent:"
The words "fraudulent" and
"void" mean constructively fraud-
ulent and voidable upon action by
creditors.
Newman vs. Garfield, 104 At.
881.
Though the word "void" is used
in the statute, in legal effect it
means voidable at the instance of
McGreenery vs. Murphy, 76 N.
H. 338, 39 L. R. A. (N.S.) 374.
?attaching creditors.
The Bulk Sales Law of Nevada
employs the terms "void" and
"fraudulent." Construing that
statute in the case of Escalle vs.
Marks, 183Pac. 387, the court held
that ia was not the intention of the
legislature to make the sales void
as against all persons.
attaching creditors.
When construed in the light of
the purpose of the statute, it was
clearly the intention of the legisla-
ture that the sale'should be voida-
ble only.
We shall now see what effect the
violation of the Bulk Sales Law has
upon the dealings of the purchaser
and seller. It is our contention that
this law since it is for the protection
of creditors, leaves the sale valid as
far as the immediate parties are con-
cerned. They are bound by their
promises just as effectually as if they
had complied with the statute. The
right to set the sale aside for their
negligence is in the creditors exclu-
sively. No one else has such a pow-
er. Nor can the creditor be called
to exercise his right. At common
law transactions of this nature were
always, as against the original par-
ties, held to be valid. After one of
the individuals has fully performed
his obligations, the other cannot as
an excuse for his non-performance
set up the fact that the agreement
was prejudicial to the interests of
creditors. This principle is best ex-
emplified in Elmore vs. Elmore, 58
S. W. 980, where the defendant to
defeat B, in an action for breach of
promise then pending transferred his
real estate to a relative, retaining the
possession of it. Later the grantee
brought ejectment and the defendant
pleaded the fraudulent character of
the transfer. The court, however,
deemed this fact no defense. In
granting the writ, the following re-
marks were made: While this deed
is fraudulent as to the party in the
breach of promise action, it is bind-
ing upon both the grantor and gran-
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tee. A grantor in a fraudulent deed
cannot plead the fraud and avoid the
deed so as to defeat a recovery of the
land. He cannot thus avoid the le-
gal consequences of his own act.
To the same effect are Jones vs.
Jenkins,7 Ky. L. Rep. 408, and Gary
vs Jacobson, 30 Am. Rep. 514, 55
Miss. 204. The last case was a suit
on a promissory note executed by the
defendant as part payment of a stock
of goods sold by one Carter to de-
fraud his creditors. Plaintiff also
had reason to know the fraudulent
purpose of Carter. Below is the
opinion of Justice Chalmers, who
held the note valid:
The transaction is harmful only
to the creditors of the vendor. If
they do not complain-if they ac-
quiesce, why should the grantee be
permitted to escape payment of his
ill-gotten gains. There is a manifest
distinction between conveyances in
defraud of creditors and offenses
against the penal law. * * By
one the body politic, the sovereign
commonwealth, is wronged, by the
other those only who have an inter-
est in undoing the fraud, and this
umber is limited in our state to pre-
existing creditors. As to them the
transaction is void, or rather, void-
able at their election. As to all oth-
ers it is valid and obligatory.
The foregoing is a clear and con-
cis8 statement of the rule as it wa-
prior to the Bulk Sales Laws. Now
since the new law changes the old
one only by the addition of a special
remedy, contracts in violation of this
statute are by necessary implication
valid. As between the parties to
them these conveyances are final and
binding in every detail, with title
passing to the purchaser where it
remaiis until divested by creditors
in the appropriate proceedings. To
rescind or excuse his failure to per..
form the covenant, the plaintiff or
the defendant, as the case may be,
will have to advance a better reason
than the fact that the sale was preju-
dicial to the interests of the grant-
or's creditors. To preclude the par-
ty who has abided by his part of the
obligation from recovering, the aid
of the statute cannot be successfully
invoked. For a bar he must offer
some other ground, as failure of con-
sideration, infancy, payment, or the
like. Now it might be contended
that the validity of these transfers is
only apparent; that they pass title
for the reason that once the grantee
has possession, he grantor is power-
less to divest the other of that right.
In other words, the transaction is
valid because the court deems it un-
worthy of its interference. Such a
contention is not logical. When the
statutory violation is not an opera-
tive fact in the plainiff's cause of ac-
tion, he is entitled to the aid of the
law. Nor can the defendant set up
thie failure to comply with the stat-
ute when rescission on other grounds
is sought. See Ferguson vs. Dent,
24 Federal 412. Escalle vs. Marks,
183 PPac. 387, was an action by the
seller to recover the unpaid part of
the purchase price of a stock of goods
sold in violation of the regulations
governing salesin bulk. The defend-
ant claimed that the sale was abso-
lutely null and void, and for that rea-
son the plaintiff could not recover
The court, however, entertained a
different view. Below is an excerpt
from the sound opinion of that trib-
unal:
It was not the intention of the leg-
islature to make such transactions
void as against all persons. When
construed in the light of the purpose
of the statute, it shows clearly the
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intention of the legislature was that
the sale should be voidable only.
The facts in McGreenery vs. Mur-
phy, 76 N. H. 338, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.)
374, are different from those in the
case under consideration. However,
the principle enunciated therein may
afford us some light. The creditors
on trustee process attempted to
reach the goods of their debtor in the
hands of the grantee on the theory
that the latter who had no title what-
ever held the property in trust for
the debtor. The learned New Hamp-
shire court, in holding that such a
proceedings would not lie, spoke as
follows:
The terms fradulent and void re-
late to attaching creditors, who seek
to set asioe the vendee's title, which,
until set aside, is a valid title. As
between the parties to the sale, the
title passed to the vendee, and it re-
mains in him until it is vacated by a
creditor of the vendor, upon proceed-
ings instituted for that purpose, or
until the vendee disposes of the prop-
erty. Though the word void is used
in the statute, in legal effect, it means
viodable at the instance of the credi-
tors.
To the same effect is Schmucker
vs. Lawler, 38 Penn. Super. 578.
There it was held the creditor had no
remedy of garnishment, as the pur-
chaser cannot be considered a debtor
of the seller, and as between them the
rronerty is the former's absolutely,
so that he does not hold it for, or as
the property of, the latter. This is
stipported by Benson vs. Johnson, 165
Pac. 1001: "The legislation vests in
creditors a right which, when acting
for tbemselves they are at liberty to
assert or ignore." Oregon Mill Co.
vs. Hyde, 169 Pac. 791, also laid down
the proposition that the sale is valid
as between the original parties.
Now let the reasoning in the cases
above be applied to the facts in this
case. It has been plainly dpr~n'-
strated that the sale is valid between
the parties; that save for its one ir-
regularity, namely, the failure to
comply with the Bulk Sales Statute,
it is to be treated with the same
amount of respect that is accorded
every other binding contract. From
such transactions may proceed rights
to compel the enforcement on one
party's obligation if the. other has
discharged all his duties under the
compact. In any proceedings to re-
cover the goods or the purchase price
thereof it will avail the defendant
nothing to rely upon the statute.
Now it can.not with reason be alleged
that the defendant will be allowed to
plead in a suit for rescission that
which he cannot plead in an action to
compel performance. He, therefore,
should be denied the right to plead
the Bulk Sales Act in this suit for
cancellation. Upon the foregoing rea-
sons our appeal is based on the con-
tention that it was a substantial
error for the court to overrule the
plaintiff's demurrers to the answer
and the evidence of the defendant.
To escape liability he should have
shown that -the parties were in pari
delicto; that a mutual intent to de-
fraud creditors existed between the
parties; that there was an absence of
bad faith on the part of the plaintiff,
or that there were some other facts,
which tended to vitiate the plaintiff's
cause of action.
This contract for sale and exchange
was executed by Parker and Wagner
in the county of St. Joseph, Indiana.
Now it is an elemental rule of con-
tract that the validity of the agree-
ment is to be determined by the laws
of the state where the contract is
made. The reason is that the parties
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are conclusively presumed to have
had the locallaw in contemplation at
the time they became obligated. If
the contract is valid and binding in
the state where it had its inception it
is to be so regarded in all other juris-
dictions. Therefore, since the lex
loci contractus of this transaction is
Indiana, no statute but the one of this
state is to be looked to in determining
the force of the sale. Therefore the
court should have sustained the
plaintiff's objection to the defendant's
introduction of the Michigan statute.
Authority on this point is cited be-
low:
*.... as between the parties,
the law of the actual situs of the
owner at the time of the transfer,
that is, the law of .the place where the
transfer is made (lexloci contractus),
governs the validity and effect of ab-
solute conveyances of personality, in-
cluding assignments of choses in
actions and executed sales. The as-
signment, sale, or conveyance, if valid
where made, will be upheld, as be-
tween the parties, in every jurisdic-
tion in which it is called in question;
if invalid where made, it will not be
sustained elsewhere.
Minor, Conflict of Laws, 294.
Kerr vs. Urie, 86 Md. 72, 37 Atl.
789.
Marvin Safe Co. vs. Norton, 45 N.
J. L. 412, 37 Am. Rep. 566.
Weinstein vs. Freyer, 93 Ala. 257,
9 South 285.
In re Dalpay, 41 Minn. 532, 43 N.
W. 564.
Fred Miller Brew. Co. vs. De
France, 90 Iowa 395.
CONCLUSION.
The authorities cited in this hum-
ble brief show that a transfer in vio-
lation of the Bulk Sales Law is valid
as between the parties, its only de-
fect being the probability of inter-
vention on the part of creditors; that
its irregularity in this respect does
not constitute a defense to an action
based upon some other ground; and
that the validity of conveyances of
personality is to be determined by
the lex loci contractus.
I respectfully submit that for the
errors which, in my belief, have been
pointed out with sufficient clearness
in this brief, the judgment of the
court below should in all things be
reversed.
CHARLES P. J. MOONEY, Jr.
Attorney for the Appellant.
BRIEF OF WALTER A. RICE IN CASE OF
WAGNER vs. PARKER.





The statement of the. record as
contained in appellant's brief is cor-
rect and requires no comment or
amendment from appellee.
We proceed at once to a statement
of the points and authorities relied
upon by appellee to sustain the




Statutes regulating the sale and
purchase of goods in bulk exist in
twenty-two states and territories.
The most common form as to notice
of creditors is that the purchaser
mus notify the creditors, either per-
sonally or by registered mail, at
least five days before the contemplat-
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
ed sale or before the purchase price
has been paid.
Hirth. Krause Co. vs. Cohen, 177
Ind. 1, 97 N. E. I.
Kidd, D. & P. Co., vs Musselman,
217 U. S. 461., 30 Sup. Ct. 606.
II.
Unqer Burn's Ann. St. 1914 Sec.
7471. a. relating to bulk sales of mer-
chandise, which in substance is iden-
tically the same as the Bulk Sales
Law of Michigan, the question as to
whether a fraudulent intent in fact
existed and entered into the transfer
is not material and if it be found
that the purchaser complied with the
statute, the court can say as a matter
of law that the purchaser had no in-
tent to defraud the seller's creditors;
but if the purchaser failed to comply
with the statute, then the transaction
is tainted with a fraudulent intent
as a matter of law.
Geo. Kraft Co., vs. Heller, 125 N.
E. 208.
MeGreenery vs. Murphy, 76 N. H.
338, 82 Atl. 720.
Peck vs. Hibben, 185 Ind. 623, 114
N. E. 216.
The rule in relation to a convey-
ance given to defraud creditors and
without consideration, is that the law
will not aid either of the parties com-
mitting or attempting the fraud, but
will leave them where they placed
themselves, without relief. If the
contract is executory, it will not be
relieved against. If it has been per-
formed in part the law gives it effect
so far as executed, and holds it void
so far as it remains unexecuted.
III
Williams vs. Clink, 51 N. W. 453,
90 Mich, 297, 30 A. S. R. 443.
IV
Where parties enter into an agree-
ment to defraud creditors, neither
can maintain an action upon it, or
sue to recover the property conveyed.
Acheman vs. Peters, '36 So. 923,
113 La. 156.
V.
Where the parties to a fraudulent
contract have fully executed it them-
selves, courts of equity will not in-
terfere to unravel their doings, but,
considering them in pari delicto, will
leave them bound as they found
them.
In re Simmons Estate, 20 Pa. 450.
Rich vs. Hayes, 58 Atl. 62, 99
Me. 51.
VI.
And where both parties are in the
wrong a court cannot balance the
equities between them, nor give a
complaintant relief against his own
vice and folly.
Rozell vs. Redding, 26 N. W. 498,
59 Mich. 331
VII.
One to whom a debtor disposes of
his property to defraud his creditors,
which is notwithstanding seized and
sold by them cannot recover of the
debtor the value of the property so
subjected.
Surlott vs. Beddow, 19 Ky. 109.
VIII
A sale void as to creditors cannot
be made to operate to give the ven-
dee a lien for the money he has paid.
Farrer vs. Lonsby Lumber Co. 112
N. W. 726.
State Bank vs. Niles, 41 Am. Dec.
575.
Ix
"In Pri Delicto Melior est conditio
Possidentis." A maxim meaning:
"When the parties are equally in the
wrong the condition of the possessor
is the better..'
Bouvier's Law Dictionary (citing
Broom Leg. Max. 325.)
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"In Pari Delicto Potior est Con-
ditio Defendentis." A maxim mean-
ing: "Where both parties are equally
in fault, the condition of the defend-
ant is preferable." Bouvier's Law
Dictionary.
ARGUMENT
The principal error assigned by
the appellant is failure of considera-
tion. The appellee contends that
there is no failure of consideration
since title and possession passed to
the buyer but that the appellant
through his own fault in failing to
comply with the bulk sales law suf-
fered the creditors to seize the prop-
erty.
But regardless of whether or not
there was a failure of consideration,
the appellanit is barred from bring-
ing this action to rescind the contract
and to cancel the note for the law as
laid doWn in the above cited case of
Kraft vs. Heller, that the question as
to whether a fraudulent intent in
fact existed and entered into the
transfer is not material, and if it be
found that the purchaser complied
with the statute, the court can say as
a matter of law that the purchaser
had no intent to defraud the seller's
creditors; but if the purchaser failed
to comply with the statute the tran-
saction is tainted with a fraudclent
intent as a matter of law. Applying
this rule of law to the case at bar, the
court will have to find that as a mat-
ter of law the appellant had intend-
ed to defraud the creditors of the ap-
pellee, for it was shown by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the ap-
pellant had failed to comply with. the
statute. An examination of the evi-
dence will disclose that the appellant
himself testified that he did not de-
mand a list of the names of the cred-
itors, nor a list of the indebtedness
as required by the statute, he also
testified that he did not notify the
creditors either personally or by reg-
istered mail within five days. before
the contemplated sale or the pay-
ment of the purchase price. The
creditors also testified that they had
never received any notice of the sale
from the appellant either personally
or by registered mail, Applying the
rule as laid down in the above case
the court will have to find as matter
of law that the contract was entered
into with an intention to defraud
creditors; and the rule in conveyance
to a conveyance given to defraud,
creditors is; that the law will not
aid either of the parties committing
or attempting he fraud, but will leave
them where they have placed them-
selves, without relief. If the con-
trary is executory, it will not be re-
lieved against. If it has been per-
formed in part the law gives it ef-
fect so far as. executed, and holds it
void so far as it remains unexecuted.
The above rule was upheld in the
case of Williams vs. Clink, 51 N. W.
453, 90 Mich. 297, 30 Am. St. Rep.
443.
Whatever might have been the mo-
tive of the parties at the time of en-
tering into this contract is immater-
ial The law imposes upon he par-
chaser certain duties and a failure to
perform such duties is a violation of
the law. The appellant entered into
the contract with knowledge of the
existing statute and with an under-
standiny of the consequences for
failure to comply with it. After
having suffered a loss because of his
vice and folly he now comes into a
court of equity with the metaphori-
cal "unclean hands" and seeks to
have the contract rescinded. Is the
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court going to grant him relief from
a situation he himself helped to
create? The court will not allow him
to allege his own turpitude. Where
both parties are in the wrong a
court cannot balance the equities be-
tween them, nor give a complainant
relief against his own vice and folly.
Rozell vs. Redding 26 N. W. 498, 59
Mich. 331. The statute imposes the
duty upon both parties of observing
its mandates and hence where the
statute is violated by the plaintiff he
does enter the court with unclean
hands and should be denied relief.
And further, the buyer is making his
own violation of the statute the basis
of his cause of action and the posi-
tion of the defendant is the more ad-
vantageous.
It is one of the earliest principles
established, that courts of justice will
not lend their aid in enforcing con-
tracts whieh are contrary to law. If,
in transactions of this character,,
either party has obtained advantage
of the other, however great maybe
the hardship of the case courts will
not aid one violator of the law
against the other, but will leave them
as they are found. State Bank of
Mich. vs. NiIes 41 Am. Dec. 575.
The above principle was applied
in a very early Kentucky case, Sur-
lott vs. Beddow, 19 Ky. 109. In this
case an action was brought by Sur-
lott to recover the price for which a
negro was sold under the execution
of one Shanks, a judgment creditor
of Beddow. About the time the
judgment was recovered by Shank,
Beddow, at the instance and request
of Surlott executed a bill of sale to
Surlott transfering to him all of his
negroes. Shanks not regarding the
bill of sale caused an execution to is-
sue upon his judgment and had the
same levied upon the negroes men-
tioned in the bill of sale and upon in-
uiry raised by the sheriff, a jury
found the bill of sale to be fraudulent
and the negroes subject to the execu-
tion, Beddow then tendered and en-
tered into a replevin bond with Sur-
lott and one Morehead, his sureties,
for the debt of Shanks, and the ne-
groes were restored to him by the
sheriff, after the replevin bond be-
came payable Shanks caused another
execution to issue thereon against
the estate of Beddow, Surlott and
Morehead; and in virtue thereof seiz-
ed upon one of the negroes and sold
the same and applied the sale money
to the satisfaction of Shanks execu-
tion. On the day of the sale Surlott
was compelled to pay over to the
sheriff the sum of $209.50, the bal-
ance of the amount of Shanks' exe-
cution, as surety on the bond. And
it is for this sum and for the return
of the negroes that Surlott is seeking
to recover.
The trial court returned a verdict
in favor of Surlott for $209.50. Sur-
lott appealed.
The higher court held; the demand
asserted by Surlott for the price for
which the negro sold under the exe-
cution was founded in the fraudulent
transfer and upon well settled prin-
ciples, the action of assumsit could
not be sustained also held that: One
to whom a debtor disposses of his
property to defraud his creditors,
which is notwithstanding seized and
sold by them cannot recover of the
debtor the value of the property so
subjected.
The appellee wishes to cite to the
court a case in which the identical
question is involved, namely the bulk
sales act, and which is the only ques-
tion to be decided in the case at bar.
The question is raised in the case of
Farrar vs. Lonsby Lumber Co., 112
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N. W. 726. It appeared a corpora-
tion sold its stock in trade in bulk
giving a bill of sale and receiving
notes for the price. No delivery was
made. Thereafter a receiver was ap-
pointed for the corporation at the
instance of a stockholder. The pur-
chaser brought a bill to establish his
title to the property covered by the
bill of sale. The court said: "A sale
void as to creditors cannot be made
to operate to give the vendee a lien
for the money he has paid. Courts
of justice will not lend their aid in
enforcing contracts which are con-
trary to law."
CONCLUSION
In conclusion the appellee believes
that the decision of the lower court
was correct on the theory; that the
execuion of the contract in question
was in violation of the Bulk Sales
Act of Michigan and contrary to law
and that therefore appellant should
not be allowed to make his own wrong
the basis of his complaint.
Wherefore the appellee prays that
the decision of the lower court be in
all things affirmed.
All of which is respectfully sub-
mitted to the Honorable Supreme
Court of Notre Dame.
WALTER RICE,
Attorney for Appellee.






Vincent B. Peter and
Aaron H. Huguenard,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.





Defendant files motion for judg-
ment non obstante veredicto, which
is overruled by the court, to which
ruling defendant excepts.
Defendant files motion and causes
for new trial. Motion overruled and
defendant excepts. Defendant also
files motion in arrest of judgment
which the court overrules, and to
which ruling defendant takes excep-
tion.
Plaintiff moves for judgment on
the verdict, which motion is sustain-
ed. Judgment that plaintiff have and
recover of and from defendant the
sum of Six Hundred and Fifty Dol-
lars ($50) together with the costs of
the action, taxed at $ - , all col-
lectible without relief from valuation
and appraisement laws.
Defendant takes exception to the
judgment and prays an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Notre Dame. Ap-
peal granted upon the filing of ap-
peal bond within ten days, in the sum
of $800 with William Miner and
Sherman McCabe as sureties there-
on, which bond is hereby approved.

















Trial resumes and oncluded.
Arguments of counsel heard.
Court, being fully advised, finds
for the plaintiff that his cause of ac-
tion is sustained, that he should have
and recover of and from the defend-
ant the sum of Two Hundred Dol-
lars ($200), together with the costs
of the action, all taxed at $-,
and all collectible with relief from
valuation and appraisement laws.
Defendant files motion and causes
for new trial, which motion the
court overrules with exception to de-
fendant. Motion in arrest of judg-
ment also files which the court over-
rules, granting exception to defend-
ant.
Plaintiff's motion for judgment on
the finding is sustained. Judgment
according to the finding.
Defendant takes exception to the
judgment and prays appeal to the
Supreme Court, which is granted.
Appeal bond is to be filed within ten
days, and is fixed in the sum of $400
with William Fitzgerald and Charles
M. Dunn as sureties, which bond is
hereby approved by the court. Thirty
days are given in which to file gen-
eral bill of exceptions.
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Arthur C. Kenney and
Harry E. Denney,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.




Plaintiff brings action to recover
$200 paid to defendant as purchase
price for a horse, harness and buggy.
Plaintiff was a minor at the time of
purchase, a married man with wife
and child, worked as a day laborer
for the support, of himself and fam-
ily, and did not use the purchased
property except for pleasure pur-
poses. Plaintiff, at the time of bring-
ing the action, had sold the harness
and buggy. and the horse had 'been
condemned by the Society For the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals as
unfit for use. Notwithstanding plain-
tiff offered no return of the property
purchased, he seeks to recover the
money paid by him as stated.
TRIAL RECORD.
Plaintiff shows that on May 8th.
1921, he filed complaint and praecipe
for summons. Defendant appears by
counsel and files several demurrer to
the 1st and 2nd paragraphs of com-
plaint. Court sustains demurrer to
the 1st paragraph of complaint, to
which ruling the plaintiff excepts.
Court overrules demurrer to the 2nd
paragraph of complaint, to which
ruling the defendant excepts.
Defendant files answer in four
paragraphs. Plaintiff files motion to
require defendant to separate each of
the 2nd, 3rd and 4th paragraphs of
answer and number them as separate
paragraphs of defense. Court over-
rules the motion to separate as to
each of the paragraphs, to which rul.
ings the plaintiff severally excepts.
Plaintiff files motion to strike out
certain parts of the 4th paragraph of
answer, which motion is overruled
by the court, to which ruling the
plaintiff evcepts.
Plaintiff files several demurrer to
the nd, 3rd and 4th paragraphs of
answer. The court sustains the de-
murrer to the 2nd paragraph. De-
fendont files amended 2nd paragraph
of answer, to which plaintiff files de-
murrer, which demurrer the court
overrules, and to which ruling plain-
tiff excepts. Defendant confesses de-
murrer to the 3rd paragraph of an-
swer and files amended 3rd 'para-
graph. Plaintiff files demurrer to
the amended 3rd paragraph of an-
swer. Plaintiff asks and is granted
leave to withdraw demurrer to
amended 3rd paragraph of answer.
Plaintiff withdraws demurrer and
files motion to strike out certain
parts thereof, on the ground that
they are merely argumentative gen-
eral denial. Court sustains this mo-
tion. and strikes out the parts indi-
cated in the motion. The court now
sustains the demurrer to the amend-
ed 2nd paragraph of answer which
the court heretofore overruled, to
which ruling the defendant excepts.
The Court now overrules the demur-
rer to the 4th paragraph of answer.
to which ruling plaintiff excepts.
Defendants file additional or 5th
paragraph of answer in set-off.
Plaintiff files motion to strike out the
5th paragraph of answer in set-off,
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which is sustained and to which rul-
ing the defendant excepts.
Plaintiff files reply in general de-
nial to each of the 1st, 3rd and 4th
paragraphs of answer.
The case now stands on plaintiff's
2nd paragraph of complaint, de-
fendant's 1st, 3rd and 4th para-
graphs of answer, pleading as de-
fense, general denial, that the ar-
ticles purchased were necessaries for
plaintiff and his family, and that de-
fendant defrauded plaintiff to secure
the purchase of the property and has,
notwithstanding such fraud, never
offered to return or make restitution
therefor, plaintiff's denial of these
facts.
Jury is now empannelled, sworn,
and the cause is submitted for trial.
Trial begun and plaintiff's case in
chief concluded. Defendant moves
for non suit, which motion is over-
ruled and exception granted. Trial
concluded.
Both plaintiff and defendant ten-
der certain instructions, some of
which are given with exception to the
other party, and some are refused
with exception properly taken. The
court indicates before the argument
what instructions will be given.
Arguments are made by all of
counsel for parties.
The court now reads to the jury
the instructions, numbered from I to
9 inclusive, whichthecourt then files
and orders to be made part of the
record without bill of exceptions.
Parties taken exceptions to certain
instructions as indicated thereon and
attested by the court.
The jury then retire to their jury
room to deliberate on the case, aild
are in charge of a sworn jury bailiff.
Come the jury into open court and
return their verdict, which is as fol-
lows: "We, the jury, find for the
plaintiff and assess his damages in
the sum of $200.00. J. G. Welsh,
Foreman."
CAUSE NO. 23.
John D. Carson, as Administrator
of Estate of Ray Stephens, decd.
VS.
Charles D. Simpson and
Edward Williams.
Patrick E. Granfield and
Edward M. Dundon,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.




Ray Stephens entered into an
areement with Charles D. Simpson
to sell him a horse on approval. The
understanding was that Simpson was
to take the horse and try him, and if
the horse should suit him, give
Stephens his note with approved se-
curity; but if the horse should not
suit him, he was to return him to
Stephens. A few days after the
agreement and the taking of the
horse by Simpson, Stephens was
killed. Simpson did not return the
horse and did not execute or offer to
execute his note, but later traded the
horse to the other defendant, Edward
Williams. Plaintiff brings action in
replevin to recover the horse or its
value.
TRIAL RECORD.
Plaintiff shows to the court that on
May 23rd, 1921, he filed his com-
plaint and praecipe for summons.
Return of sheriff filed. Defendants
appear by their counsel and file mo-
tion to require plaintiff to make his
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complaint more definite and certain
in the particulars stated in motion.
Motion overruled to which defend-
ants separately except.
Defendants file separate demurrer
to complaint which is sustained by
the court. Plaintiff files amended
complaint.
Defendants file separate demurrer
to the amended complaint. Court
overrules demurrer to amended com-
plaint, to which ruling the defend-
ants separately except.
Defendant, Simpson, files separate
answer in two paragraphs, and the
defendant, Williams, also filed sep-
arate answer in two paragraphs.
Plaintiff files motion to strike out
the second paragraph of separate an-
swer of defendant, Simpson. Motion
sustained to which ruling said de-
fendant excepts. Plaintiff filea mo-
tion to strike out the second para-
graph of answer of defendant, Wil-
liams, which motion is also sustain-




In re Grand Jury,
April Term, 1921.
Come now the grand jurors, here-
tofore regularly drawn and summon-
ed for service at the April Term,
1921, of the Notre Dame Circuit
Court, who are now sworn and quali-
fied to discharge their duties as such
jurors. The Court now instructs said
grand jury in open court and they
retire in charge of a sworn grand
jury bailiff to begin their work.
The Court does now appoint as
Prosecuting Attorney for the State
of Indiana, to prosecute its pleas at
this term of court, Edward J. Len-
non; and as Deputy Prosecuting At-
torney, J. Stanley Bradburry is ap-
pointed.
The following statement of facts
is submitted to the Prosecuting At-
torney for presentation to the Grand
Jury, upon which to base any indict-
ments, to-wit:
STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR
GRAND JURY.
Hough S. Breaker and Ura Halpin
decided to break into the house of
John Carroll which is situated on the
corner of Main and Colfex Streets in
South Bend, Indiana. Pursuant to
plans, they went to the house at 8:00
o'clock, p. m., January 3, 1921.
Breaker went to the rear door, while
Halpin stood watching and waiting
to give any alarm necessary to avert
detection and thwart their plans.
Just as Breaker was putting a skele-
ton key into the door lock, Mrs. John
Carroll, suddenly opened the door,
and, seeing Breaker, ran frightened
and screaming from the house.
Breaker hurriedly went in and, find-
ing a watch, a lady's wrist watch of
South Bend Watch Co. make, 16
jewels, gold filled case, valued at $50,
together with a gold band for holding
the watch which was valued at $10.
While this was transpiring, Halpin
blew a whistle at the approach of a
policeman, and both Breaker and
Halpin blew a whistle at the ap-
proach of a policeman, and both
Breaker and Halpin ran from the
house, Breaker taking with him the
watch and band attached.
In South Bend, a week later,
Breaker and Halpin sold the watch
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and chain-band to Isaac Treeball, for
$15. The watch has engraved on it
the monogram J. C., which stands for
Jennie Carroll, Mrs. Carroll's name.
Isaac Treeball has a shady reputa-
tion for dealing' in other people's
property, and he knows the bad rep-
utation of jreaker and Halpin. He
knows the real value of the watch
and band and he observes the mono-
gram when he buys them from
Breaker and Halpin.
Next day after purchasing the
property, Treeball sold the same to
John Day, representing to 'him at
the time that the letters J. C. stand
for Jim Cook, and stating that Cook
had failed o redeem them from pawn
for a loan of $25, and Day thereupon
bought the watch and band for that
sum.
Day gave the property to his wife
as a present and in a few days there-
after Mrs. Day, while visiting at the
home of Mrs. Carroll, displayed her
gift, which Mrs. Carroll immediate-
ly recognized as her watch and band,
recently stolen from her.
Come now Joseph W. Nyikos, John
T. Riley, Francis J. Galvin, Eugene
M. Hines, James F. Young and Wil-
liam E. Shea, s the regular Grand
Jury, and return into open court the
following Indictments, to-wit:
Indictment No. 4, against Hough
S. Breaker and Ura Halpin for con-
spiracy to commit a felony;
Indictment against Hough S.
Breaker and Ura Halpin, in two
counts, namely, for burglary and
grand larceny;
Indictment against Isaac Treeball
for receiving stolen goods.
The court orders bench war-
rants for the arrest of Hough S.
Breaker and Ura Halpin on indict-
ments Nos. 4 and 5, and for Isaac
Treeball on indictment No. 6.
Comes now the sheriff and brings
into court the indicted persons under
arrest and makes return of the war-
rants.
The court now appoints John C.
Cochran and Edward S. DeGree as
attorneys for the several defendants
in the cases.
Court now fixes the bonds at $500
for each defendant, which bonds are
now executed and approved, filed and
accepted in behalf of each defendant,
and the cases are continued and set
for trial, April 22, 1921.
Court convened pursuant to ad-
journment with the regula~r judge






Indictment for Conspiracy to
Commit a Felony.
Comes defendant in person and by
his counsel, and come also the attor-
neys for the State.
Defendants move to quash the in-
dictment, which motion the court
overrules, and to which ruling de-
fendants except.
Defendants are now arraigned in
open court and for their separate
pleas, say they are not guilty.
Come now the regularly selected
petit jury venire of twelve men chos-
en to try the pleas of this court at
this term.
Defendants separately challenge
the array. Challenge overruled, to
which defendants separately except.
Jury is empanelled, sworn and ac-
cepted to try the case.
Facts are submitted and the argu-
-ments of counsel for the State and
the defendants are made. The court
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then instructs the jury which retires
to deliberate on the case, in charge
of a qualified bailiff. Come now the
jury into open court and return their
verdict: "We, the jury, find the de-
fendants not guilty. E. W. Gould,
Foreman."
In accordance with the verdict, the
court does now adjudge, order and-
decree that the defendants go acquit
of the charges in the indictment.
The court, regularly convening






Indictment for Burglary and
Grand Larceny
Defendant comes in person and by
his counsel, and the State also ap-
pears by its representatives.
Defendants. separately move to
quash the indictment and each count
thereof. The court overrules the
separate motions to quash as to each
of the counts of indictment, to which
ruling on each count, the defendants
separately except.
Defendants now waive arraign-
men and for their separate pleas say
they are not guilty.
Case is submitted to the jury
which is duly empanelled and sworn
and accepted to try the case. Trial
is concluded on the statement of
facts presented, the arguments of
counsel are heard, and the jury is in-
structed by the court, and now retire
in charge of a sworn jury bailiff to
deliberate on the case.
Come the jury and return into open
court their verdict, to-wit: "We, the
jury, find the defendants, Hough S.
Breaker and Ura Halpin, guilty as
they stand charged in the indictment,
of grand larceny, and we find that
Hough S. Breaker is 67 years of age,
and that Ura Halpin is 75 years of
age. E. W. Gould, Foreman."
Motions for new trial overruled
and judgment on the verdict. De-
fendants sentenced according to the
indeterminate sentence law.
The regular judge and officers
convened court in regular session





Indictment for Receiving Stolen
Goods.
Defendant appears in person and
by his counsel and files motion and
affidavit for change of venue from
the judge. After argument by coun-
sel for State and defendant on this
motion, the defendant asks and is
granted leave to withdraw motion.
Motion withdrawn.
Defendant moves to quash the in-
dictment. Motion overruled.
Defendant now waives arraign-
ment upon the indictment and for his
plea, says he is guilty as charged.
Defendant's counsel make earnest
pleas for suspended sentence in be-
half of their client, Isaac Treeball.
The State resists the plea. Court
finds, in accordance with the plea of
the defendant, that he is guilty of re-
ceiving stolen gQods as charged in
the indictment and finds that he is
37 years of age.
The court sustains the plea for
suspended sentence, and the defend-
ant is permitted to go on his own
recognizance during good conduct,
subject to order of court.
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ONLY OUR 0
IN CONGRATULATION.
By Edwin A. Frederickson, LL. B.
Members of the Ltiw Class of 1921,
I congratulate you. Your position is
surely an enviable one, for it is only
in recognition of your now being un-
deniably qualified to plunge into the
realities of life that Notre Dame
passes you on; and I am sincere in
my best wishes, for I am honestly of
the opinion that, because of the par-
ticular training you have had, your
genuine success can mean only the
exertion of a wholesome and benefi-
cial influence upon all those \with
whom you come in contact, in short,
that your progress not only can be,
but unquestionably will be, a power
for the good of your fellow-man.
But, even so, notwithstanding the
fact that you have "so well merited as
to be proclaimed publicly and solemn-
ly, and so forth," let me admonish
you: this is truly and literally but
your commencement, and the way is
not easy, and there are no short-cuts.
No, this is not pessimism, rather the
friendliest of encouragement, for is
it not implicitly the promise of a goal
most desirable, are not always the
things we prize most in this life the
things especially cherished by us be-
cause of the difficulties experienced in
their attainment? And, furthermore,
I want to assure you, that if you have
found mere study of the colossal
science fascinating, its practice will
eclipse even your fondest expecta-
tions. And now, merely in a spirit
of helpfulness, and even at the risk
of being deemed presumptuous, I
humbly submit the following sugges-
tions, to-wit:
WN OPINION
Don't grow impatient-Rome was
not built in a day;
Don't forget the statutes-most of
them are constitutional;
Don't despise your old text books-
it's amazing what twisted ideas old
lawyers often have of the fundamen-
tals of some subjects;
Don't give snap judgments-be
justly proud of your legal opinions;
Collect briefs-not books;
Read the authorities against you
most carefully-they are easier to
distinguish in the office than in court;
Use the opinions of other attor-
neys as leads-not as the law;
Cross-examine cautiously - "two-
edged swords" must be wielded with
care;
Cross-examine your client every
time you see him-the things he keeps
secret are the most dangerous;
Let no man waste your time-it's
more valuable than that of the most
prominent member of your bar-you
have yet many of the things to learn
that he already knows;
Don't worry about underpay now
-you'll be overpaid later on;
Urge any settlement within reason
-defeat is ever a possibility and sat-
isfie dcustomers are the prize assets
of any business;
Remember-the law is a business
and service its first requisite;
Never take the other lawyer for a
fool-he may not be paying you the
same compliment;
An array of keen counsel across
the table is not a disadvantage-
rather, an education;
Don't antagonize the court-he is
human and possesses discretionary
powers;
Know your Evidence-it is safer
to be weak in International Law;
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Think twice before you close your
case-pleading isn't proving;
Put your whole soul into the argu-
ment-but don't depend on it;
Don't let a jury surprise you-no
one has ever yet solved that riddle;
The size of a case may regulate
your fee-it never governs the
amount of law possibly involved:
To know all the law is impossible
-to know all the law on the point is
not only possible but absolutely essen-
tial;
Consider that day wasted upon
which you learn no new law;
Either love the law or leave it-for
truly "the law is a jealous mistress."
But now,,worthy graduates, lest I
seem needlessly profuse in the mat-
ter of mere congratulations, permit
me in conclusion to assure you that
it is not without regret that Notre
Dane witnesses your departure, and
that the Hoynes' College of Law will
feel keenly your absence, but that
supreme consolation there is in the
thought that you cannot help but
realize that meri graduation does not
serve to sever completely the ties that
link one to an institution of learning,
that you must understand the hearty
welcome that awaits you ever at your
Alma Mater, and that you must fully
appreciate the genuine pleasure your
future visits, however short, will af-
ford those who stay on after you,
those who have learned both to know
and to respect you, not excluding
Your sincere friend,
EDWIN A. FREDRICKSON.
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COMMON LAW ACTION IN EQUITY GARB.
(Explanatory Letter Following)
By
Vincent Giblin, LL.B., '18
In the Circuit Court of the Seventh
Judicial Circuit of Florida. In and
for Brevard County.
0. K. Key, Plaintiff,
VS.
Florida East Coast Railway Com-
pany, a Florida corporation, defend-
ant.
Declaration in Suit for Damages.
To the Circuit Court of the Sev-
enth Judicial Circuit of Florida, in
and for Brevard County; Greetings:
Your orator, 0. K. Key, a resident
of Brevard County, Florida, brings
this, his action for damages against
the Florida East Coast Railway
Company, a Florida corporation and
thereupon respectfully showeth:
First
That the Florida East Coast Rail-
way Company, a Florida corporation,
hereinafter called the defendant, has
injured and damaged your orator in
the sum of $500.00.
Second
Your orator shows that said de-
fendant owns and operates a line of
railroad tracks running through the
County of Brevard, said State of
Florida and on the night of the 28th
of August A. D. 1920, said defendant
through their agents and employes
were running and operating a train
over said line which said train pass-
ed through the City of Cocoa in the
County of Brevard about twelve
o'clock on the night of Aug. 28th,
1920. Your orator shows that in
operating said train over said road
and line, the said defendant, through
their agents and employes were care-
less and negligent and through the
carelessness of the agents and em-
ployes of said defendant, the said de-
fendant injured and damaged your
orator in the sum of $500.00.
Third
Your orator shows that on the 28th
day of August. A. D. 1920, your or-
ator was the owner of one large
mouse colored horse mule of the
value of $300.00, which said mule
was run over and killed by the said
defendant's train above mentioned
in the City of Cocoa, Brevard County
Florida between mile post 173 and
174 on defendant's railroad track
wherein the said defendant injured
and damaged your orator in the sum
of $500.00.
Fourth
Your orator shows that at the
point where trie said defendant,
through their agents and employes
run over and killed said described
mule, the property of your orator,
the track is straight for a long dis-
tance in each direction from said
point and there was nothing in the
way to hinder the engineer in charge
of and operating said train from
seeing and detecting said mule long
before said mule was hit by the en-
gine pulling said train; your orator
shows that described mule was run
over and killed on a street crossing
in the city of Cocoa and that the en-
gineer in charge of said train did
not ring the bell, blow the whistle or
attempt to bring the train to a stoT
after he had discovered said mule on
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defendant's track. Your orator fur-
ther shows that the engineer in
charge of said train did not keep the
proper watch-out as he was ap-
proaching a road crossing, and by
keeping a proper watch-out he could
have seen the said mule and thereby
prevented running over and killing
same. Your orator show*s further
that at the time the defendant,
through their agents and employes
run over and killed your orator's
said mule, the engineer in charge of
said train was running said train
at a fast and reckless rate of speed,
notwithstanding the fact that he was
running said train through the in-
corporate limits of the City of Cocoa
and approaching a public street
crossing, said train was running at
a rate of 30 miles per hour and when
the engine struck said mule, it knock-
ed the said mule several feet in the
air which was caused by the fast and
reckless running of said train, all of
which was due to the carelessness
and negligence of the defendant
through their agents and employes
and running over and killing said de-
scribed mule being due to the care-
lessness and negligence of the de-
fendant t~hrough their agents and
employees and thereby injuring and
damaging your orator in the sum of
$500.00, which the said defendant
refuses to pay after demand in writ-
ing having been made.
Wherefore, your orator, placing
himself upon his country, prays





Judge F. J. Vurpillat,
University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana.
My Dear Judge:
One is never too old to learn, and
I am forwarding for your further
enlightenment on the subject of
pleading, a rare specimen of a com-
mon law declaration. Bearing in
mind that Florida is still a common
law State, you will note that the
pleader has rather skillfully and
technically blended equity and law.
A reading of this rather unique
declaration will in some degree ex-
plain why I have chosen Florida as a
field for my professional labor, for
the weaker the opposition the less
difficult of attainment is the goal of
success. While the enclosure is not
typical of the efforts of a Florida
lawyer, I have found that a great
many of the members of the bar in
this section have sadly neglected
their education upon the subjects of
pleading and practice. This condi-
tion is largely due, I think, to the
leniency of the bar ex,1mination.
Trusting that this finds you in the
enjoyment of good health and pros-
perity, and with kihdest personal re-
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NEWS SECTION.
The Class of '21 at the Bar.
Memphis, Tenn., July 29.
Dear Judge Vurpillat:
Last week I was informed by the
bar examiners that I had successful-
ly passed the examination of June
10. So I am writing this short letter
to thank you and the other members
of the faculty for the wonderful pre-
paration I received at Notre Dame.
There were 118 candidates for ad-
mission. Of these about 40 failed.
This is a very high average for Ten-
nessee. Of course, it does not equal
the number that fail in the much-
vaunted Illinois tests, but it shows
that the requirements for admission
come up to the standard set by ma-
jority of the states.
I learned secretly-the statutes
prohibiting any informatiorm concern-
ing the grades of the candidates oth-
er than that they made a passing-
mark-that my paper was the best
of the 118. Of course this sounds a
bit boastful, but I think we all have
that. privilege. Inasmuch as I am
from Tennessee instead of Illinois, I
cannot say that the exams were the
hardest in the last decade. Hence do
I say that I made the highest aver-
age. Other members of the bar who
graded the papers assured me that
mine was the highest.
The exam. consisted of four papers
each containing 20 questions. Each
question was in the form of a hypo-
thetical state of facts covered by
some point of general law-they did
not give us much statutory stuff. On
about a third of these questions I
had answers that I had received at
N. D. In many instances I was able
to cite them cases that had been as-
signed for reading at school. Anong
these were Norrington vs. Wright-
a favorite of Prof. Tiernan-the De-
troit Free Press case, Wood\vard-
Holmes Co., vs. Nutt, and Leisy vs.
Hardin.
There are other cases that I had
looked up at Notre Dame that stood
me in good on the examination, al-
though I could not remember their
exact titles. For instance, the -Mis-
sissippi case on the proposition of
compelling parties to refrain from
bringing suits growing out of a sin-
gle transaction, the case covering the
disposition by administration of a
decedent's real and personal proper-
ty that is situated in different states,
and the one often referred to by
Judge Farabaugh on subterranean
water rights. Incidentally, I man-
aged to use the Dartmouth College
case.
I have not yet hung out my shingle.
At present, I am picking up the news
for the paper around the police head-
quarters and the municipal court. I
am not learning a lot of law in the
latter place. About the only consti-
tution the judge of that tribunal is
familiar with is that of the Red Men
or the Woodmen of the World. The
way they make these negro vagrants
and crapshooters testify against
themselves reminds one of an army
court-martial. Yesterday a country
boy was fined $10 for disorderly con-
duct because he would not permit the
police to enter his room unless they
could produce a warrant. When I
protested with the judge after court
about the decision, he said, "Ah, hell,
you're one of these hair-splitting
technical-minded lawyers!"
I expect to start the practice of
law within a couple of months.
Capt. J. M. Canada, a corporation
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lawyer, has offered to take me into
his office. Here I shall have an ex-
cellent opportunity to get away
from the post, inasmuch as Mr. Can-
ada has no relatives in his office
whom he must take care of.
Please give my regards and thanks
for what they have taught me to
Profs. Tiernan, Farabaugh, Costel-
lo and Frederickson. I am here to
state that the methods used by the
faculty of N. D. are head and shoul-
ders above those resorted to by other
institutions. The old case and text-
book system enabled me to knock the
examination for a row of saloons.
Any fellow who has made an at-
tempt, however feeble, to apply him-
self to the course need fear no dif-
ficulty in obtaining admission to the
bar. This practice of taking a quiz
course after graduation is unneces-
sary; the student is sufficiently
equipped at Notre Dame.
Things are in a fine state in Shelby
county. On account of recent mur-
ders and assaults, the local chamber!
of commerce has organized a com-
mittee of 200 vigilantes to assist the
state authorities in enforcing the
law. On their first raid last night,
they arrested seven n~groesshooting
dice in an empty boiler. The pris-
oners were taken before Squire Ma-
her this morning and were fined $5
for gaming and $4.15 for costs.
There is no getting away from it;
the law in Shelby county has vindi-
cated itself.
The reason for the prevailing law-
lessness here is the fact that our jur-
ies will not convict. The defendant
surrounds himself with his women
folks and employs some unrecon-
structed lawyer who prates about
the chivalry of the South and the
glory of its womanhood. The result
is an acquittal. Well, what can one
expect in a country where the farm-
ers make the laws.
Well I guess this is enough of this
balderdash. Before closing, I might
add that one subject, which, by the
way, is not listed in the catalogue,
but is taught at Notre Dame, played
an important part in my passing the
exam. It was the old heifer dust. I
used about 200 words of it on each
question.
Let me hear from you soon. I in-
tend to keep in touch with the school.
to the end of my days. If there is
ever any chance for me to be of any
assistance to the law college, be sure
to let me know. Thanking you and
the others for what you have done
for me, I am
Your sincere friend,
Charles P. J. Mooney, Jr.
Care Commercial Appeal,
Memphis,' Tenn.
Minneapolic, May 16, '21
Hon. F. J. Vurpillatt,
Dean, Notre Dame Law School,
Notre Dame, Indiana.
My dear Judge:
I have forwarded to youthebarex-
amination questions of the State of
Minnesota for the past year. It gives
me reat pleasure to say that I have
successfully passed the examination
and am now admitted to the bar of
this State. I forward these ques-
tions in order that the Minnesota
boys who intend to return here may
have an opportunity to know the
kind of questions which are asked
on the examination.
A great many questions are asked
on the Code and are very important,
I think, and those who intend to prac-
tice here should study the Code, eith-
er by way of class room or in a pri-
NOTRE DAME LAW REPORTER
vate way. I merely suggest this, so
that they won't have it quite as hard
as I did cramming for this examina-
tion.
I am also forwarding you a copy of
the Rules for Admission to the Bar.
There may be some changes in them
in the coming year. I would advise
that those boys who wish to take the
bar examination should obtain a new
copy from the Secretary. You will
note that it is required that a stu-
dent be a resident here for six
months before he is admitted to ap-
ply for examination. This is rather
a hardship on the boys, of course,
and the only way this is waived is if
a student has served in the forces,
either of the army or navy, for a per-
iod of six months during the late
war.
I extend my heartiest good wishes
to yourself and faculty and to all the
members of the school, and wish you
all success.
Very respectfully,
J. P. O'Hra, '20.
NOTES
William S. Allen, Edmund J.
Meagher, Henry W. Frit%,, George
Wittereid and Clyde A. Walsh will
take the Bar examination in Illinois
on October 5th.
A letter from Alden J. Cusick in-
forms us that he has entered the field
of life insurance, having taken up the
work as special agent in Chicago for
the Northwestern Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co., with offics in the Rookery
Bldg. Mr. Cusick, however, has ap-
plied for his certificate in prepara-
tion for taking the Illirois Bar ex-














































Harry F. Kelly, of
Kelly & Kelly,
Eastwood
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DIRECTORY
Of the Notre Dame Law Alumni
In Forwarding Business to a Distant Point Remember Your
Fellow Alumni Appearing in This List.
ARIZONA Budd-
Arthur B. Hughes
s V. Robins, Campus-
Melrose St. Francis T. Walsh
ARKANSAS Chicago-
Francis O'Shaughenessy,
lock- 10 S. LaSalle St.
o Brizzolara,E. Sixth St. Hugh O'Neill,
Conway Bldg.
CALIFORNIA Charles W. Bachman,
geles- 836 W. Fifty-fourth St.
ace Cocgrove, John Jos. Cook,
1 Title Insurance Bldg. 3171 Hudson Ave.
G. Mott, of James V. Cunningham,
itt & Cross, 1610 Conway Bldg.
Citizens National Bank Bldg. Hugh J. Daly,
ael J. McGarry, 614 Woodland Park
Higgins Bldg. Leo J. Hassenauer,
B. Ward, 1916 Harris Trust Bldg.
1 Willowbrook Ave. William C. Henry,
ancisco- 7451 Buell Ave.
onsus Heer, John S. Hummer,)I Sacramento St. 710-69 W. Washington St.
Albert M. Kelly,
COLORADO 2200 Fullerton Ave.
e- Daniel L. Madden,
s Hanlon Conway Building
Clement C. Mitchell,
CONNECTICUT 69 W. Washington St.
ort- William J. McGrath,
to Lepore, 648 N. Carpenter St.
E. Washington Ave. Thos. J. McManus,
ond W. Murrayv 5719 Michigan Ave.
Noble Ave. John F. O'Connell,
Nobl A155 N. Clark St.
Joseph P. O'Hara,
s Curry and Thos. Curry, of 1060 The Rookeryrry & Curry,)'Esops Bld., 647 Main St. Clifford O'Sullivan,2500 E. Eeventy-fourth St.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Stephen F. Reardon,
gton- 405 Peoples Life Bldg.
thy Ansberry, Francis X. Rydzewski,
8-12 Southein Bldg. 8300 Burley Ave.
Delbert D. Smith,
GEORGIA 3966 Lake Park Ave.
Fred L. Steers,
Wood, 1350 First National Bank Bldg.
E. Fourth St. Max St. George,
108 S. LaSalle St.
ILLINOIS Decatur-
William P. Downey,
rt Milrov. 110 N. Water St.
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East St. Louis-
Joseph B. McGlynn and Daniel McGlynn,
of McGlynn& McGlynn,































408 Peoples Bank Bldg.
Mt. Carmel-
Martin E. Walter,
119 W. Seventh St.
Ottowa-
































































Frank M. Hogan, of
Colerick & Hogan,
Cor. Court and Berry Sts.
Emmett A. Rohyans,







Henry B. Snyder and Patrick Maloney,









324 W. Jefferson St.
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Lafayette-
Francis J. Murphy,
430 S. Third St.












622 S. Brownson St.
lichigan City-
Lorenzo Glascott,
223 W. Tenth St.
James Kenefick,















410 Union Trust Bldg.
G. A. Farabaugh and
E. A. Fredrickson,
504 J. M. S. Bldg.
Samuel Feiwell,
404 Citizens Bank Bldg.
Charles Hagerty,
J. M. S. Bldg.
Vernon R. Helman,






334-36 Farmers Trust Bldg.
Joseph J. Kovacs,
109 N. College St.
Arthur May,








406 Citizens Bank Bldg.
John E. Peak,
224-26 Farmers Trust Bldg.
George W. Sands,
211-12 Convervative Life Bldg.
Armand Schellinger,
415-16 Union Trust Bldg.
George Schock
Samuel Schwartz,
706 J. M. S. Bldg.
Edwin H. Sommerer,

















































































910 Flint P. Smith Bldg.
Grand Rapids-
Joseph Riley,


















1774 Gerard Ave., S.
St. Cloud-
George L. Murphy,



















825 W. Quartz St.
John Ward,











































Care John J. Sullivan,
203 Broadway
Peter M Elligott,

















427 Second National Bank Bldg.
Walter MeCourt,




























































1412 S. Boulder St.
Leo Holland
Patrick M. Malloy,
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Edward Gallagher,
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(The Case- Winning Set)
INfill
Do you know there are enough
automobiles in the state of
Iowa to move the entire popu-
lation ofthat state across the
border into Canada at a mo- Ready On oi Before May 1st, 1921
ment's notice?
The total number of automo-
biles registered the past year
will exceed 9,300,000,averaging THE S
one automobile to every eleven
persons in the country. This AUTHORTY AUTOMBILES
will give you an idea of the ON AU T MOBILES
magnitude ofthe subject dealt
with In Berry Automobiles, The Whole Law of Automobiles Exhaustively Treated by the
1921 foremost writer on this subject in America
References to Neeligence and Compensation Cases Annotated. Reporter System. A. L. R. Trinity and other Serges.
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